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ABSTRACT

This document is the discussion guide for a four part video/print series designed to contribute to the understanding of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and the summitry process which has become such a visible part of it. Each of the four 30-minute programs interweaves archival material with informal discussions by distinguished scholars about participants in previous summits. The illustrated discussion guide features scholarly essays and a chronology of U.S.-Soviet summits. It poses questions and guides learners to additional resources for further study. For each unit the guide contains a background essay, an introduction to the video program, questions to consider, and a list of suggested readings. Unit 1: "Sources of U.S.-Soviet Summitry," covers the rise of the two superpowers and the recent record of serious meetings among world leaders. Unit 2: "World Wars to Cold War, 1917-1955," illuminates the early days of U.S.-Soviet relations. It deals with the U.S.-Soviet alliance in World War II and the Cold War period through the first postwar summit in 1955. Unit 3: "Adversarial Summits, 1955-1987," surveys the irregular pattern of U.S.-Soviet summits since 1955. Unit 4: "Basic Issues in U.S.-Soviet Summitry," considers some of the fundamental questions which emerge time and again around superpower summits, including arms control, regional issues, bilateral issues, and human rights. (GEA)

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Discussion Guide

FACE TO FACE

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U.S.–Soviet Summitry

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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

SOUTH CAROLINA ETV NETWORK

FACE-TO-FACE

U.S.-Soviet Summitry

Introduction

Whenever an American president and a Soviet general secretary meet it is news. Off and on, this story has been running now for over four decades. **Face-to-Face** looks at the origins and history of this phenomenon.

In the fall of 1987, as preparations for Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev's Washington summit were unfolding, distinguished scholars of U.S.-Soviet summitry met in a public television studio to hold informed but informal conversations about this extraordinary experience. The interplay of their varying opinions forms the basis for this series.

Although meetings of prominent leaders reach back to ancient history, the term "summit" is new. Prime Minister Winston Churchill first coined the expression to designate a top-level meeting in 1943 when he met with President Franklin Roosevelt in Quebec. "It is indispensable that the entire unity of aim and method should be maintained," he said, "at the summit of the war direction." Churchill used the expression again ten years later in an address to the House of Commons, and in 1955, the press used the phrase "summit diplomacy" in connection with the conference at Geneva. So, early summits—Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, Geneva—were actually known in their own time simply as conferences. And "summitry," a term used with increasing frequency, has come to designate the practice of national leaders meeting as peers empowered to make decisions.

However visible U.S.-Soviet summits have become, they are only one piece of the diplomatic process. Normal diplomacy continues on other tracks, even during periods of stress when American and Soviet leaders are not meeting. Still, summits are a valuable element in Superpower diplomacy. In order to maximize their effectiveness, both American presidents and the public need to keep them in perspective and to understand their place in the larger picture of the American-Soviet relationship. All those involved in the making of **Face-to-Face** hope that the information contained in this series will generate new insight and exploration into the American-Soviet relationship and the summitry process.

Using the Face-to-Face Series

Face-to-Face is designed in four units:

1. Sources of U.S.-Soviet Summitry
2. World Wars to Cold War, 1917-1955
3. Adversarial Summits, 1955-1987
4. Basic Issues in U.S.-Soviet Summitry

Each unit includes a section from this discussion guide and a 30-minute video program. The discussion guide is organized in a straightforward fashion, and it is recommended that learners proceed through each of the sections in their natural order. For each unit, the guide contains a background essay, an introduction to the video program, questions to consider, and a list of suggested readings. After reading the essay and video introduction, watch the video program, and then complete the rest of the unit. The **Face-to-Face** discussion guide also features a chronology of U.S.-Soviet summits, located at the center of the guide.

Meet the Participants

Moderators

James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress. Former director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution; Professor of history, Princeton University. Specialty: Russian history. Author: *Fire in the Minds of Men*; *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture*.

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.; Chairman, Education and Training Committee of the Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace; Professor of history, Boston University; recipient of the United Nations Peace Medal (1986). Specialty: American history. Author: *Freedom and Crisis: An American History; Between the Wars: American Foreign Policy from Versailles to Pearl Harbor; Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case.*

Panelists

Stephen E. Ambrose, Professor of history, University of New Orleans. Specialty: military diplomatic history. Author: *Nixon: The Education of a Politician; Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President Elect*; *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938.*

Robert R. Bowie, lawyer (retired); Professor of law, Founder and director of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Director of Policy Planning Staff, Counselor to Department of State during the Eisenhower administration; Deputy Director for Intelligence of the CIA during the Carter administration. Specialty: foreign policy. Author: *Shaping the Future: Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition*; *Suez Nineteen Fifty-Six.*

Diane Shaver Clemens, Professor of history, University of California, Berkeley. Specialty: American and Soviet-American diplomatic history. Author: *The Politics of Coalition*; *Executive Agreements*; *Yalta*.

Robert Conquest, Senior research fellow and scholar-curator of the Russian and East European collection of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; served in Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service at posts including the United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations. Specialty: Soviet history and politics. Author: *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*; *Power & Policy in the USSR.*

Robert Dallek, Professor of history, University of California at Los Angeles. Specialty: twentieth century American diplomatic history. Author: *Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism*; *The American Style of Foreign Policy*: *Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs*; *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945.*

Alton Frye, Washington Director and Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. Specialty: foreign and domestic policy problems. Author: *A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security*; *Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933-41.*

Alonzo L. Hamby, Professor of history, Ohio University. Specialty: twentieth century American history. Author: *Liberalism and Its Challengers: F.D.R. to Reagan*; *The Imperial Years: The United States since 1939*; *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism.*

Robert E. Hunter, Director of European Studies and Senior Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.; served on National Security Council staff during the Carter administration in charge of West European and Middle East affairs, and on the White House staff during the Johnson administration. Specialty: foreign policy. Author: *Presidential Control of Foreign Policy*; *The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East: Security in Europe.*

Donald Kagan, Professor of history and classics, Yale University. Specialty: ancient history. Author: *The Great Dialogue: A History of Greek Political Thought from Homer to Polybius*; *The Western Heritage*; *The Fall of the Athenian Empire.*

Robert Legvold, Director, W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union; Professor of political science, Columbia University. Specialty: Soviet foreign policy. Author: *The Soviet Union and the Other Superpower: Soviet Policy Toward the United States, 1969 to the Present*; *Soviet Policy in West Africa.*

William H. McNeill, Professor of history, emeritus, University of Chicago. Specialty: world and contemporary history. Author: More than 20 books, including *Pursuit of Power*; *Plagues and Peoples*; *The Rise of the West*; *America, Britain & Russia 1941-46.*

Richard N. Rosecrance, Professor of international relations, Cornell University; guest scholar, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, Johnson administration. Specialty: international strategy and international economics. Author: *The Rise of the Trading State.*

W.W. Rostow, Professor of economics and history, University of Texas, Austin; recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1969); Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Johnson; Deputy Special Assistant to the President and Chairman of Policy Planning Council, State Department, during the Kennedy administration. Specialty: history of the world economy, patterns of economic growth, diplomatic history. Author: *The World Economy: History and Prospect*; *The United States in the World Arena*; *The Process of Economic Growth.*



Brent Scowcroft, Vice Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C.; Lt. General U.S. Air Force (retired); National Security Advisor to President Ford; served on the National Security Council staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Nixon administration. Specialty: national security and foreign policy. Editor: *Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin.*

Gaddis Smith, Professor of history, Yale University. Specialty: American diplomatic history. Author: *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years; American Diplomacy During the Second World War; Dean Acheson.*

Adam B. Ulam, Director of the Russian Research Center, Gurney Professor of History and Political Science, Harvard University. Specialty: revolutionary currents within Russian history. Author: *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982; Expansion and Coexistence; Stalin: The Man and His Era; The Rivals.*

Contributor

Kenneth L. Adelman, Vice President, Institute for Contemporary Studies, Washington, D.C., Former Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in the Reagan administration; Assistant to the Secretary of Defense during the Ford administration. Specialty: foreign and defense policy, and has also taught Shakespeare and African studies. Author: *African Realities.*
(Mr. Adelman's program contribution was taped separately to include updated material on the Reagan summits.)

Unit 1:

Sources of U.S.-Soviet Summitry

Key Ideas

- Formal meetings between leaders, especially of adversarial powers, have occurred throughout history, but rarely until modern times did they meet as equals to negotiate seriously.
- Most governmental systems impose formal limitations on their leaders' ability to commit their countries in negotiations, requiring support from powerful groups in their society. This was true even in the days of supposedly "absolute monarchs" before the twentieth century.
- The U.S.-Soviet "Superpower" relationship, and the form of summitry practiced as a part of it have their origins in European Great Power diplomacy of the 1800s.

Alexander I

(both): Library of Congress

The first meeting to resemble those between the United States and the Soviet Union—an East-West bilateral meeting—took place in 1807 between Napoleon (left) and Alexander I of Russia (right). The two met on a raft at Tilsit where they schemed to divide Europe between themselves, with France garnering lands in the west, and Russia, those in the east.

Background Essay

In December 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sat down in Teheran with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet General Secretary Josef Stalin. Though this first meeting of the "Big Three" allies was of special importance to the war effort, it was only one more of FDR's many meetings with the leaders of nations allied in the fight against the Axis powers.

Even with his keen sense of history, Roosevelt could not have known he was initiating what has become the historical phenomenon of U.S.-Soviet summitry, a process which still goes on nearly half a century later. As allies or adversaries, all the American and Soviet leaders who have served more than a few months have participated in meetings with their counterparts "at the summit."

Though it has deep historical roots, this unique relationship results from the confluence of two experiences. One is the legacy of nineteenth-century diplomacy among the European Great Powers. The other, also rooted in nineteenth-century Europe, is the pattern of what we now call summit meetings: business-like face-to-face meetings between leaders able to negotiate seriously.

Of course, European rulers met before the nineteenth century. Perhaps the most famous early meeting, at Canossa in 1077, is remembered for its negative lessons. When German nobles began siding with the Pope in a long-standing dispute with the papacy over control of the selection of the German clergy, it threatened the rule of excommunicated Emperor Henry IV. So Henry slipped into Northern Italy to kneel in penance before Pope Gregory VII and gain the absolution which preserved his crown. Though Henry later drove Gregory from the papal throne, the image of the emperor kneeling in the snow remained a powerful symbol of royal humiliation.

Meetings between equals came later. Henry VIII of England, one of the most talented, self-confident and adaptable of Renaissance rulers, was perhaps the first to use such meetings effectively in a sort of early "balance of power" diplomacy. The French royal familiy was involved in a long-running contest for supremacy in Western Europe with the Hapsburgs, rulers of Spain and the German Holy Roman Empire. Allied with both sides at various points in the conflict, Henry met

personally with rulers from both dynasties. He met with both Emperor Maximilian I, with whom he campaigned against the French, and his Hapsburg successor, Charles V. Best remembered is his legendary meeting in 1520 with the Valois King Francis I of France, England's traditional adversary and the Hapsburg's rival on the continent. The site of their meeting near Calais was dubbed "The Field of the Cloth of Gold" for its opulence as the two royal parties sought to impress one another. The two Renaissance men discussed diplomatic issues, dined and danced as protocol demanded, and even had a wrestling match in which Francis threw the Englishman and probably deepened Henry's resentment of his French rival. But, grand as Henry's face-to-face diplomacy was, it did little to change the patterns of early modern European statecraft.

There are a number of reasons for this. First, until recently travel was slow and uncomfortable, especially with the entourages which accompanied rulers. A jumble of competing claims to territory and titles complicated diplomatic protocol in a formal era, making it difficult even to set good ground rules for such meetings. And many rulers—and perhaps even more of their diplomatic advisers—worried about the dangers of such meetings, anxious to avoid the appearance of having "gone to Canossa" if such a meeting turned out badly. Consequently, there is an old and considerable body of literature warning against the dangers of personal negotiation conducted outside the formal channels of traditional diplomacy.

For a variety of reasons, face-to-face diplomacy by European rulers became normal only after revolutionary changes in Europe had broken down traditional patterns of governance and widened the circle of opinion to which rulers felt they had to appeal. The first summit to look like today's between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.—a bilateral, East-West meeting between powerful leaders—took place in 1807. Napoleon, the self-crowned Emperor of the French, called for the meeting with Tsar Alexander I of Russia. On a raft at the Prussian town of Tilsit, on the Nieman River, they talked about dividing the world. Despite their grandiose schemes, however, nothing enduring resulted, and within five years the French Grand Army set out on its disastrous rendezvous with the Russian winter.

National Archives: U.S. Army Signal Corps

Although the thirty sovereign states involved in World War I were represented at Versailles, the treaty which emerged was largely the work of the "Big Four." Shown here are Premier Vittorio Orlando of Italy (a lesser partner, he did not participate in the most important negotiations), Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Britain, Premier Georges Clemenceau of France, and President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's dominant position at Versailles symbolized the emergence of the United States as the world's newest and greatest power. The Soviet Union, newly formed out of Tsarist Russia, was not represented in the deliberations at Versailles' Hall of Mirrors.

Leaders attended several successful international meetings in nineteenth-century Europe. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 dealt with the aftermath of the French Revolution and the quarter-century of warfare which ensued. An international conference at Berlin in 1878 was called by the German Chancellor Bismarck, who was working with Prime Minister Disraeli of Britain to avoid war among Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Turkish Ottoman Empire over their conflicting interests in Eastern Europe. Bismarck called another at Berlin in 1885, to be followed four years later by a similar meeting in Brussels, at which efforts were made to define rules for Great Power behavior in partitioning Africa.

These major conferences could be successful only if the participants could truly speak for their nations, as Henry and Francis, or Napoleon or Alexander, obviously could. Though not themselves rulers, by the late nineteenth century governmental leaders like Bismarck and Disraeli were clearly empowered to negotiate for their governments.

In the generation before 1914, as travel became easier and more comfortable, meetings among European rulers became more common. Unlike Napoleon and Alexander, most rulers of the time had constitutional limitations on their ability to commit their countries. Therefore, though these dynastic meetings had political purposes, the monarchs themselves often performed largely social and ceremonial functions. This was made less difficult by the fact that many of the rulers of

Europe were kin, related through the families of Queen Victoria of Britain and her German-born consort, Prince Albert. Popular press coverage of these meetings made personal contact between leaders appear to be an important element in European diplomacy.

This impression was certified by the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919. There it was not the remaining monarchs but the real leaders of the victorious Allies—including Woodrow Wilson, making the first trip abroad of any American president—who met face-to-face to redraw the map of Europe after World War I. Years of war propaganda had made these leaders celebrities.

Personal diplomacy became even more common in the years after Versailles. Furthermore, unlike a generation before, there was no doubt that the leaders who met by the 1930s had the power to make decisions. In 1905, even Tsar Nicholas II and German Kaiser Wilhelm II could not get a treaty they had personally negotiated at Bjorko accepted by their foreign ministries. But no one doubted that Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin could commit their nations. Hence, the meetings among leaders in the tense, war-wary Europe of the period could hold out real hope of solutions to problems. The most famous such meeting was the four-power conference in Munich in 1938, where Britain and France agreed to turn part of Czechoslovakia over to the Nazis to buy the "peace in our time" which Chamberlain said the deal guaranteed. Munich did delay the war a year. But Hitler took over the rest of Czechoslovakia within a matter of months, and Munich joined Canossa as a negative lesson in diplomatic literature.

Consequently, by 1943 the meeting at Teheran seemed logical for the leaders of the World War II allies. That conference, and the subsequent "Big Three" meetings at Yalta and Potsdam, fitted and furthered an established pattern of international dealings. In the years since, as new transportation and communications technologies have made personal contact ever easier, summitry has become common throughout the world. American presidents and Soviet general secretaries frequently meet with other leaders in a variety of situations.

Thus, it is not summitry itself which is now so special, but the nature of the relationship within which U.S.-Soviet summits take place. Today's U.S.-Soviet summits are normally bilateral, unlike the conferences which typified earlier European diplomatic summitry. The evolution of this bilateral relationship from the tradition of multilateral nineteenth-century European Great Power diplomacy is the other source of contemporary U.S.-Soviet summitry.

Like summitry itself, the roots of European Great Power diplomacy go back at least into the sixteenth century, to the changing balance between Hapsburg and Valois which concerned Henry VIII. But the system was clearly defined only as Europe came to dominate the rest of the world in the late nineteenth century.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 brought Vladimir Ulyanov, better known by his underground alias, Lenin, to power. Lenin's Soviet regime followed 300 years of rule by the Romanov dynasty, and introduced a new world view—Communism—to the political arena. Lenin's revolutionary ideas competed with democratic values, and it would not be until 1933 under Josef Stalin's rule (nine years after Lenin's death), that the United States and the Soviet Union would establish diplomatic ties.

And Europe was dominant. Around the turn of the twentieth century, the so-called "European hegemony" was real to most of the world. European analytical thought, political organization, artistic expression, and industrial development were preeminent. But, beyond the realm of ideas, European hegemony was a political fact.

Six Great Powers dominated Europe during this period: Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Only Hapsburg Austria-Hungary, with its shaky rule over polyglot nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe, was confined to the continent. Five powers had non-European holdings: Italy's and Germany's were relatively small; those of Britain and France dominated Africa, South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands; and Russia had the largest empire of all, stretching more than eight thousand miles from Poland to the Pacific. Along with the colonial holdings of smaller states which they supported—like Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Turkey—the Great Powers exercised political control by 1914 over virtually all of Europe, Africa and Asia. And the areas not under their control—like Persia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and China—were often scenes of competition among the Powers for commercial, if not political, advantage.

Even where Europe's power was not a political fact, its legacy lent authority. In the Americas, largely made up of independent nations which had once been European colonies, most people looked back to Europe for cultural and political models. Though proud of being part of their "New World," most North and South Americans traced their roots to Europe.

Europe's position of power in the world was due to its organizational skills and its technological advantages. The rapid advances in commercial and technological development of the industrial revolution had given

Europe an advantage over the rest of the world. The resulting vigor and flexibility of the European economy placed the Great Powers at the center of a global commercial system.

That system relied not only upon Europe's intellectual and economic authority but also on its military power. Its industrial base gave Europe a military advantage over less technically developed societies and permitted its relatively inexpensive expansion of political power into Asia and Africa in the last half of the nineteenth century. The size and technical sophistication of a nation's armed forces, especially its navy, defined its capacity to project power around the world.

Nor was the lesson of power lost on a Europe which had seen two Great Powers, the German Empire and Kingdom of Italy, finally assembled only by force of arms as late as the period of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71. In the Europe of the late-1800s, a nation's standing was secured by translating its industrial base into military power. The rapid expansion of European influence around the world created a variety of potential conflicts which might lead to war. So, even as its navies grew for projecting power abroad, Europe's armies grew for protection at home. Uniforms seemed everywhere, and rulers often appeared in military dress.

These growing European arsenals made the periodic threats to peace ever more alarming. Skillful diplomacy, like that at the Berlin conference in 1878, managed to avoid large European wars, if not always small ones. Mutual apprehension led European power politics to revolve increasingly around a system of alliances built upon combinations of Great Powers and designed to maintain a balance of power. In 1914, the assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg throne in the Balkans, long an international hotspot, led to the "Great War" which all feared but most hoped to avoid. No Bismarck or Disraeli prevented the general conflagration this time, and Europe slipped into the abyss of modern warfare.

By the end of World War I in 1918, the old European system had collapsed. Even the victorious Allies who met the next year at the Versailles Conference to settle the war's scores were weakened by its cost in blood, in treasure, and in shattered self-confidence. Despite the Western victors' work at Versailles, the European hegemony was doomed. Within a few decades, the empires would be gone.

Evidence of the war's damage was even more immediate in the East. The losing powers, whose leaders were not negotiating at the Conference, were punished harshly. The Empire of the Hapsburgs was divided into a cluster of new nations based upon ethnicity. The Ottoman Empire was broken up, and its non-Turkish lands lost. Germany was charged with a huge reparations bill, and lost territory to the new states created by the Versailles Conference in Eastern Europe. By the time the Conference met, the Romanov dynasty, rulers of Imperial Russia for more than three hundred years, was already gone, swept away by the whirlwind of revolution and civil war. In its place was Lenin's revolutionary Soviet regime, with its advocacy of total assault on the old system of European values.

The change in Europe's status was clear at Versailles, where the greatest power at the table was not European at all, but the United States. America's rise to that position had been rapid. After acquiring a small overseas empire from Spain almost accidentally in 1898, the U.S. had become a significant player in the Great Power game within a decade. This was largely due to the energetic activity of Theodore Roosevelt, its president in early years of the century.

TR, as the popular "penny press" called him, had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the outbreak of the Spanish War. He recognized the importance of naval power, and as president, he oversaw the rapid upgrading of the U.S. Navy. He dispatched the "Great White Fleet" around the world to show the flag of a new global power. To link the two oceans the expanded navy would patrol, he supported the initiation of an American-built canal through Panama, whose independence from Colombia he encouraged.

The new visibility in world affairs for the U.S., and for TR himself, was symbolized by his winning the Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Even while playing a popular peace-making role in that conflict, Roosevelt did something which triggered considerable opposition. To help forestall the danger of a European war over competing French and German colonial claims in Morocco, Roosevelt oversaw the first American foray into European Great Power diplomacy. American participation in the resulting Algeciras Conference in January 1906 revived long-standing American apprehensions about becoming entangled in the affairs of Europe. And, though the U.S. Senate did approve the resulting agreement, its debate and addition to the treaty of a "reservation" concerning "traditional American foreign policy" were harbingers of later fights over American commitments to multilateral international agreements.

Woodrow Wilson finished Roosevelt's work of leading the U.S. to the first rank among Great Powers. In the Great War, American intervention turned the tide in the Allies' favor. At the Peace Conference at Versailles, the idealistic Wilson got European support for his idea of the League of Nations, a permament international body designed to avoid conflicts like that of 1914. But he never persuaded his countrymen to join, and died embittered over Americans' unwillingness to remain actively involved in the new, more democratic international order which he envisioned.

Postwar Europe struggled with the adjustment to its diminished position in the world. Revolutionary uprisings, often influenced by the Russian Revolution, were put down violently in a number of countries in the years right after the war. Economic woes—inflation in the early 1920s, and then the Great

Depression later—and a continuing fear of "red" revolution, exaggerated the effects of social change and unrest on the continent and helped dictatorships rise where monarchies had stood before the war, in Central and Eastern Europe, in Turkey and the Iberian Peninsula.

Often justified as anti-communist, many of the new dictatorships were at least in part modeled after Lenin's one-party state. Especially frightening to most Europeans were the "Axis Powers." Two old European Great Powers now in the hands of dictators, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, joined with Japan in an aggressive alliance. Europeans cast about for a way to resist the "new order" in Central Europe, while avoiding another war. The conference at Munich was one such effort.

Munich did not buy peace, though it did buy some time. But in 1939, a second European war began, even more damaging than the first. In August of that year, Adolf Hitler sought to secure his position by signing a Non-Aggression Pact with his supposed mortal enemy, Josef Stalin, Lenin's heir as dictator of the Soviet Union. With this insurance policy in his pocket, and convinced after Munich that his democratic adversaries in the West would continue to avoid war, Hitler invaded Poland, gambling his country on its military might and his judgment of the leaders with whom he was dealing. Hitler lost his gamble when Britain and France honored their commitment to Poland and went to war. After six years of brutal warfare, most of Europe was impoverished and in ruins when peace was finally secured after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

Library of Congress

Intermarriage among the ruling families of Europe, common in the 19th and early 20th centuries, assured dynastic power across the continent and helped limit tension between states. Cousins King George V of England (left) and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, (right) whose countries made up the western and easternmost edges of Europe, were descendants of Queen Victoria of England and Prince Albert, her German-born consort.

The United States again helped the Allies defeat the Axis Powers, first by means short of war; then, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, with its wholehearted military commitment. The only industrial power largely undamaged at war's end, its war-stimulated economy and nuclear capacity made the U.S. the dominant power in the postwar world.

And, despite sustaining enormous damage when the first years of fighting took place on its own soil, the Soviet Union emerged from the war as the other true victor. It had more territory than in 1939, keeping the lands in Poland and the Baltic region which it had occupied while allied to the Nazis. It had the largest military force on the ground in Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union was thus the only other nation besides the U.S. whose relative power was actually increased by the war.

Where several powers had competed forty years before, now only the two "Superpowers" remained, with conflicting worldwide interests based upon fundamental differences in their view of the proper society. The relationship between these two would dominate world politics for the next half century, and the meetings at the summit between their leaders would rivet the attention of millions of observers.

About the Video Program

SOURCES OF U.S. SUMMITRY deals with the history of the two experiences which flow together to define the contemporary "Superpower" relationship: the concept of summitry itself and the breakdown of the multilateral system of European Great Power diplomacy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Each subject is treated in both the archival documentary footage at the beginning of the program and in discussion among the panelists later.

The section on summitry begins with the first modern-looking meetings between Henry VIII of England and his contemporary rulers. It then takes the viewer through such meetings as those of Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I at Tilsit; Bismarck's Berlin conferences; the sessions around the Treaty of Versailles; Munich, the fateful meeting of Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier which sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia; and the wartime meetings of the "Big Three" leaders: Franklin D. Roosevelt of the U.S.; Winston Churchill of Great Britain and Josef Stalin of the U.S.S.R.

The section on Great Power diplomacy illustrates the scale of world power held at the time of the first world war by the six European Great Powers: Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Based upon their technological advantages in the nineteenth century, the system was destroyed by the massive damage of two wars, which had battles fought around the globe but which were settled principally by combat on European soil. By the end of the second war in 1945, only the U.S. and Soviet Union emerged relatively more powerful than when the fighting began and they would dominate world affairs for the next half century as the six powers had in the century before.

The panelists discuss not only the issues of summitry and the

evolution of Great Power diplomacy, but also related issues, including the role of personality and leadership in summitry. New to most viewers will be William McNeill's presentation of the idea of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as "marcher states" and Donald Kagan's analogy between the U.S.-Soviet confrontation and that of Athens and Sparta in the fifth century B.C.

Questions to Consider

1. In the video program, James Billington recalls that Napoleon called Tsar Alexander "the Talma of the North," referring to a great actor of the time. What advantages might an actor have not only in being perceived but also in perceiving an opponent? In what ways is diplomacy like theater?

2. In what ways is contemporary European leadership the same as it was in the nineteenth century? In what ways is it different? How do you account for the differences?

3. By the time Franklin Roosevelt and Josef Stalin met at Teheran their countries had become the dominant military powers in the alliance against the Axis. What events contributed to each nation's rise to this position? At what point was each recognized as a major power?

4. William McNeill says in the video that the American-Soviet relationship conforms to a pattern of marginal powers rising to the first rank within a system of states. These predominant powers arise on a larger geographical scale out of the frontier, and their size allows them to "eclipse" smaller states. This has occurred about twelve times in history. Recall other times in history that nations, or powers, rose to such authority. Since there are no more frontiers on earth, what factors do you think will influence the rise of marginal powers in the future?

5. Face-to-face diplomacy among leaders has changed over time. Compare the following meetings of leaders. Consider each ruler's position in relation to his counterpart(s), circumstances which may have given one leader leverage over another, and technological developments which have influenced these meetings.

- German Emperor Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII at Canossa;
- Henry VIII of England and Francis I of France near Calais;
- Emperor Napoleon of France and Tsar Alexander II of Russia at Tilsit;
- "The Big Four" at Versailles.
- "The Big Three" at Teheran

6. What skills helped Europe rise to a position of preeminent authority? Provide examples of where European countries exhibited these skills.

7. The background essay discusses "European hegemony." Since the rise of the American and Soviet Superpowers, is there an "American hegemony" or a "Soviet hegemony"? Or is there perhaps a "Japanese hegemony"? What evidence supports your view?

8. Since Henry IV's meeting with Pope Gregory VII in 1077, leaders have been warned of the dangers of "going to Canossa." What is implied in this phrase? Recall times when a leader might have done well to heed such advice.

Suggested Readings

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Unit 2:

World Wars to Cold War, 1917-1955

Key Ideas

- The initial U.S.-Soviet relationship was founded on mutual ignorance. Each country's opinion of the other was largely based on stereotypes.
- The Russian Revolution coincided with the emergence of the United States as a world power, and each viewed its own vision of the world as a model for other nations.
- American relations with Imperial Russia were generally friendly, while relations with Russia's revolutionary successor, the Soviet Union, have alternated between guarded cooperation and hostility.

U.S. Army, Courtesy Harry S. Truman Library

When the "Big Three"—Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill—met at Teheran in 1943, their discussions concentrated on military strategy. It was the first such meeting between American and Soviet leaders, and it set a new tone for East-West relations. Upon concluding their meeting, the three leaders wrote in the Declaration of Teheran, "We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose."

Background Essay

In 1955, at the height of his popularity, President Dwight Eisenhower agreed to meet with the new Soviet leadership in Geneva. For the first time since the days of their alliance against the Axis Powers in World War II, the leaders of the now-adversarial "Superpowers" were to undertake face-to-face discussions.

It was not an easy decision for Eisenhower to make after the decade of Soviet-American hostility since the end of the war. This "Cold War" period had strongly reinforced American suspicions of the Soviets' behavior and the hostility to their goals which dated back to the Bolshevik revolution some forty years before.

One aspect of Eisenhower's summit symbolized an important thread in the history of the relationship between the nations. The Americans went into the meeting uncertain about who was really in charge in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin two years before. But then, American uncertainty about precisely what was taking place in Russian corridors of power was not new. It was the norm in dealing with a country where the traditional secretiveness of the Tsarist regime had only been intensified under the Soviets.

In fact, it can be argued that the U.S.-Soviet relationship was founded upon a substantial degree of mutual ignorance, for at the time of the Russian Revolution each nation operated largely on stereotypical images of the other.

In general, the first century of U.S. diplomatic relations with Imperial Russia had been friendly. In 1780, Empress Catherine had helped form the "Armed Neutrality," which generally supported the newly independent Americans' position against the claims of British maritime warfare. Her grandson, Tsar Alexander I, offered to mediate the War of 1812. In the 1820s he settled Russian claims to lands in the American West, avoiding the kind of friction with the expanding American republic which would threaten war with Britain over Oregon and actually result in war with Mexico over Texas and California. Later, Alexander II supported the Union

position in the American Civil War and sold Alaska to the United States in 1867 for $7.2 million, thereby removing the most likely point of future U.S.-Russian difficulties.

Even so, most American opinions of Russia were based upon stereotypes, often unflattering. This was a result of the limited personal contact between Americans and Russians.

There were a number of reasons for this. Like the U.S., nineteenth-century Russia was largely isolated from the day-to-day affairs of Europe and occupied with its internal development. Most of Russia's economic contacts were with European financial institutions, so commercial relationships with the U.S. were limited. China, not Russia, was the nation which took on the almost mythical role as the vast future market for American enterprise, so Russia never received the commercial attention Americans focused on its Asian neighbor. Few Americans got to know Russians through missionary or other religious activity, due to the entrenched position of the Russian Orthodox Church. Culturally, Russia was outside the mainstream of Western European thought, from which American arts and letters had sprung, and the society its writers depicted seemed foreign and unfamiliar to Americans. Finally, the great wave of immigration to America around the turn of the twentieth century brought from Eastern Europe groups whose languages and customs often made assimilation into American society difficult. The immigrants from the Russian Empire, largely from its disaffected minority populations, brought tales of primitive living conditions, of uncaring and inefficient bureaucrats, and of capricious and sometimes cruel agents of the autocracy. To rapidly industrializing, individualistic American society, these stories only reinforced an image of a strange and backward Russia weighed down by a despotic government.

In fact, this stereotype may even have helped delay American entry into World War I. Despite German provocations, even pro-Allied Americans worried about supporting such a regime. In the spring of 1917—shortly after the Germans declared unrestricted submarine warfare—revolution overthrew the Russian monarchy and replaced it with a provisional government committed to democratic principles. Able now to be allied only to governments which were "fit partners in a league of honor," President Wilson soon led the U.S. into the war against the despotic Central Powers, as Germany, Austria-Hungary and their allies were known.

This situation changed within a matter of months. The Bolsheviks' "October Revolution" overthrew the provisional government and replaced it with one officially committed to a revolutionary new international order. Seen by various historians as everything from the inevitable march of history to a coup d'etat by a group of well-organized political opportunists, this Bolshevik stroke changed the course of history, including the pattern of the Russian-American relationship.

The new regime which Lenin led attacked many of the principles upon which American government and society were based. Beyond claiming that the state, not individuals, ought to own all major economic enterprises, the Soviets denied its citizens individual rights which Americans considered basic, such as freedom of speech and religion. The Bolshevik view of the world lumped Americans into the single stereotypical image of capitalist enemies. These Soviet positions angered and frightened many Americans. Reflecting this, Wilson refused to receive the ambassador sent by the Soviets, and official relations were not established until 1933.

The revolution in Russia coincided with the emergence of the United States as the greatest of the Western powers. At the Versailles conference, which the Soviets did not attend, Wilson was clearly the dominant figure. The idea from the conference of which Wilson was most proud was that of a League of Nations which could prevent a repetition of conflicts like that of 1914-18, both by serving as a permanent international forum for the exchange of ideas and by providing for a system of mutual security.

To Wilson, the League was a triumph in international affairs of basic democratic principles. To his dismay, the United States never joined the League. Even so, the idea that the world should move

Photo by Dorothea Lange, National Archives Records of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics

Depression stretched across America during the 1930s. But its effect was worldwide and, throughout the period, most other countries as well were largely absorbed in their internal difficulties. International relations would take a back seat until the German invasion of Poland in 1939.

Cartoon by Clifford Berryman published in **The Evening Star,** *August 1918.*

Poster: The Hoover Institution

American-Soviet relations in the post-WWI period were marked by mutual moral indignation. Such indignation was reflected in political cartoons and posters from the era: a 1918 American cartoon (left) depicts American repugnance toward the new Bolshevik order, while a Russian poster (right) proclaims, "Fat capitalists with diamonds/Chained workers."

toward democratic ideals and practices, implicit in the League, was probably shared by most Americans. Even those who voted in 1920 against Wilson's party—and, thus against membership in the League—probably did so more to avoid "entanglement" with Old World politics than to repudiate the democratic premises of the League's design. Most Americans probably did feel that the U.S. should appear to others as a model of new ways of doing things, more open and free than the customs of the Old World. The American experience was seen by most in this country as the model truly worth emulating what the Puritan John Winthrop had called his experiment three hundred years before, "a City set upon a Hill, in the open view of all the earth."

The United States was not unique in its idea that it could serve as a role-model to the world. This feeling was shared by the Soviet leadership, who based their vision on the deterministic view of history in Marxist philosophy. Each nation thus felt passionately that it represented the future. Not surprisingly, given two such different visions of that future, the governments were at odds from the outset. Each questioned the other's basic legitimacy. Americans could not accept the anti-democratic "dictatorship of the proletariat" which the revolutionary regime proclaimed, even with its theoretical justification that the dictatorship would eventually "wither away" into true Communism. On the other hand, the Soviets saw American resistance to their revolution, which Marxist doctrine proclaimed as historically inevitable, as "capitalist" and reactionary.

In the years immediately after the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, the confrontation between these ideals was at its most fervent and direct. The Soviets promoted revolutionary activity in other countries, which they saw as part of a worldwide movement toward their experience. Uprisings in several European countries had to be put down with force by the governments, and fears of such violence helped prompt the "Red Scare" in the U.S. in the first months after the war. During the short run of this overreaction in the spring of 1920, a cycle of raids on radical groups and labor unions led to the rounding up of a large number of aliens, some of whom were deported illegally.

The U.S. also played a limited role in interventionary expeditions which ended up supporting anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War following the revolution. Small American forces took part in a British-led expedition based at Archangel in the North, and in a Japanese-led one at Vladivostok to the East. Though the Americans did not play a major role in these expeditions, their participation became an important part of Soviet demonology, putting the United States into the camp of the hostile nations "encircling" and threatening the new revolutionary state.

In the dark days of 1918, the Soviets held little more than the core of European Russia. By 1922, the U.S.S.R. included most of the Tsarist lands, except for the new Eastern European nations carved out at Versailles (in part as insulation against their revolution.) Its geographic limits defined, but its economy in a shambles, the Soviet Union began to move back into the international community. In 1922, the Soviets participated in an international economic conference in Italy and signed their first treaty with a non-Bolshevik power, the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, which was, after the war, the other European outcast. These actions sent the signal of a new willingness to work with other

countries. Within a year after the death of Lenin in January 1924, the U.S.S.R. was recognized by Britain, Italy, France, Japan and other powers.

Even while building up a system of relationships with other countries, the Soviet leadership never formally gave up supporting revolutionary efforts abroad, largely through the Communist International ("Comintern"), founded in 1919 as the vehicle for controlling other countries' Communist parties. But international affairs took a back seat as the Soviets' focus of attention was turned inward during these years of turmoil.

The collapse of the original revolutionary socialist economy led Lenin in 1921 to declare the "New Economic Policy" (NEP), which allowed limited private enterprise and downplayed the imposition of a socialist system by force. Initially successful at dampening discontent and reviving the economy, NEP was a victim of the changes which followed Lenin's death in 1924. It disappeared altogether in Stalin's ruthless imposition of a new socialist discipline after his political dominance was secured in 1927, when his chief rival, Leon Trotsky, was expelled from the Communist Party.

Meanwhile, the Americans too became less active on the international scene. With the election of Warren Harding as president in 1920, Americans sought to return to a prewar "normalcy" they remembered as largely domestic in its concerns. Though still engaged in various international efforts to reduce armaments and outlaw war, and to make the economic terms of the Versailles treaty work, the United States lowered its international profile in the boom years of the 1920s. This American focus on internal economic and social issues became even more intense after the beginning of the Great Depression of 1929.

The anti-Communist sentiments of most Americans had not changed; however, the lack of direct contact between the two countries, and the sense of a reduced threat which resulted from Soviet focus on domestic development, lessened the impact of this attitude. Modest non-governmental contacts with the Soviet Union continued, and American engineers did important work on the major industrial projects which were a crucial part of Stalin's efforts to develop a centralized and planned Soviet economy through his "Five-Year Plans."

Library of Congress

After years of suspicion of each other, America and the Soviet Union set aside their philosophical differences to fight a common foe. Campaigns of goodwill were the order of the day. The American-Soviet war exhibition of 1943 featured "Two Countries Young Enough to Dare Attempt Equality Among Men."

By the 1930s the relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union were dominated by their mutual hostility to the growing power of the Axis Powers, the German and Italian dictatorships and their Japanese allies.

One of the most ironic effects of the fear of Communist revolution had been the spread across Europe, often in the name of stopping Communism, of one-party dictatorships modeled on Lenin's. Dictatorships emerged in lesser powers in Eastern Europe, in Turkey, and on the Iberian Peninsula, but it was the aggressive new dictatorships in Italy and Germany, two of the old Great Powers, which most worried the rest of the world.

Hitler's rise to power in Germany and the aggressiveness of his attacks on their system revived Soviet fears of Germany and resulted in a period of "Popular Front" movements in Europe. The Comintern ordered non-Soviet Communist parties to work against Axis interests with other "anti-fascist" groups in their countries, even democrats whom they had so long opposed. This tactic, as its originators hoped, led to expanded contact between pro-Soviet groups and others in all the Western countries, including the U.S. Fed by the horrors of the Great Depression, pro-Soviet sentiment grew in educated and intellectual circles in all the democracies. The Soviets began to be portrayed as something other than the stereotypical image of "revolutionary bomb-throwers," which had replaced the stereotypes of the Tsarist period, and even Stalin's regime was seen by many as benign. The cynical Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 undercut the argument of natural alliance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and irreparably damaged Communist party recruitment in most Western countries. Even so, the effort to portray a more sympathetic vision of postrevolutionary Russia survived well enough and became the semiofficial view in the period after Hitler's invasion of Russia and Japan's attack on the U.S. drew the nations in 1941 into an alliance against the Axis Powers.

The war was prosecuted

successfully, though at an enormous cost in lives and property. A complete Allied victory was achieved in 1945. FDR hoped that the wartime alliance might have created conditions which would allow the integration of the Soviets into a peaceable postwar world built around the United Nations. However, within months of the Potsdam summit, the old suspicions and hostilities between the two powers were resurrected.

Within only a few years, the United States, which had so rapidly and optimistically disarmed after the war, found itself drawn into an increasingly hostile and dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union. Rebuilding its military was part of the American response, dictated by a variety of factors. Stalin's imposition in Eastern Europe of satellite governments directly modeled after his own, was contrary to what most Americans thought had been agreed to in the wartime discussions between Stalin and Roosevelt and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 seemed to signal an even wider ambition. Afterward, the Soviet challenges became even more direct: the blockade of Berlin, which the Western Allies supplied by air for over a year; Soviet development of nuclear weapons; and especially the fighting in Korea, where 50,000 Americans died under the flag of the U.N. in what most Americans believed was a Soviet proxy war.

In 1953, things changed. Eisenhower took office and a stable if tense truce was negotiated in Korea. After almost three decades in which he exercised a power beyond the dreams of the most autocratic Tsars, Stalin died. Within two years, at the urging of Churchill and others, Eisenhower met with the new Soviet leadership, General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin.

The meeting in Geneva was officially a conference of the "Big Four" wartime allies against the Axis, patterned after the wartime summits. In fact, it was that and something even more important: the first postwar meeting between the leaders of the two nuclear Superpowers. This meeting added to the U.S.-Soviet relationship the important new element of face-to-face contact between leaders. Geneva also began to reveal the shape of what has since become the continuous challenge to the adversarial Superpowers: that of balancing confrontation with cooperation. The story of this balancing act over the years since 1955 has been a complicated one, illuminated by the irregular pattern of summit meetings along the way.

About the Video Program

WORLD WARS TO COLD WAR, 1917-1955, looks at the early years of U.S.-Soviet relationship, through the initial summit meeting after World War II, in Geneva in 1955. Again, an archival "mini-documentary" is used to present basic information as a background for the discussion of scholars which follows.

The upheaval of World War I brought the future Superpowers to prominence on the international scene at about the same time, with opposing views of political legitimacy: Americans rejected the Soviets' hostility to individual rights enshrined in our Constitution, while the Bolsheviks saw the U.S. as a capitalist power out of tune with the "historical inevitability" of "proletarian revolution" predicted in Marxist theory. But internal concerns drew both nations back to a primary focus on domestic affairs in the 1920s, lessening their mutual hostility as contact between them diminished.

The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt finally recognized the Soviet Union in 1933. It took place in an era of cooperation against the Axis Powers, and of more favorable Western opinion of the Soviet Union, which—though damaged by the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939—became semi-official policy during World War II, producing the three summits at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam.

This cooperative phase ended abruptly after the war's end, when Stalin took a series of aggressive actions which led to American rearmament and a decade of intense hostility between the Superpowers. Stalin's death in 1953 began a process of improving relations, which led up to the first postwar summit in 1955.

Notable panelist comments are those of Robert Dallek, Gaddis Smith, Adam Ulam and others concerning the early years of the U.S.-Soviet relationship; the brief reports on the wartime summits by Dallek (Teheran), Diane Shaver Clements (Yalta), and Alonzo Hamby (Potsdam); the discussion on the opening of the Cold War; and the comments of Robert Bowie and Walt Rostow on the Geneva summit of 1955. Especially interesting is the exchange among panelists, including Smith and Alton Frye, concerning the relative advantages and disadvantages faced by democracies in dealing with non-democratic regimes at the summit.

Questions to Consider

1. Why were American and Soviet opinions of each other based on mutual ignorance until the twentieth century? To what extent do you believe this is true today? Why?

2. America's official relationship with Imperial Russia began in the late 1700s and was largely friendly until the revolutionary Soviet government took over in 1917. Recall events in which America and Russia supported each other in this earlier period.

3. America and the Soviet Union were both founded out of revolution. What was it about the Bolsheviks' "October Revolution" that the United States found so objectionable? How did Soviets regard American objections?

4. When was the "Red Scare"? When did it occur? Why?

5. In the video program Adam Ulam observes that by the 1940s the ideological element of Soviet foreign policy was largely irrelevant. He further states that, if anything, the United States has a more ideologically oriented foreign policy. Do you agree? Defend your position.

6. During the 1920s and early 1930s there was little contact between the Soviet Union and the United States. Why was this the case? How did relations change by the mid-1930s?

7. What was the "Popular Front" movement? What was its effect?

8. The timeline accompanying the chronology of U.S.-Soviet summits in this guide begins with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Even before this time, America had relations with Imperial Russia and there were significant events which would have an impact on their future relations. Construct a timeline of events which were important to the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the time period beginning in 1780 and ending in 1933.

9. Soviet and American leaders met three times—at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam—during the Second World War. What lessons were gained for each side from these meetings?

10. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were strained in the period following World War II until 1955 and, consequently, they held no summits with each other. What events contributed to this? Do you think that it would have helped to have held summits during this period?

11. How did the Cold War period reinforce American suspicions of Soviet behavior?

Suggested Readings

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Chronology of U.S.-Soviet Summitry

FEBRUARY 1917 - Germans begin unrestricted submarine warfare, knowing it may bring U.S. into war.

MARCH 1917 - Tsar is overthrown, provisional government set up.

APRIL 1917 - U.S. declares war on Germany. Lenin arrives in Russia in sealed German train.

NOVEMBER 1917 - **Bolsheviks seize power in Russia, declare cease-fire which goes into effect in December.**

JANUARY 1918 - **Wilson proposes the "Fourteen Points," his structure for peace.**

MARCH 1918 - Treaty of Brest-Litovsk officially ends war between Russia and Germany.

NOVEMBER 1918 - Armistice ends war in West.

1918-1919 - Revolutionary movements put down in various European countries.

1918-1922 - Russian civil and foreign wars following revolution, including Allied expeditions to Russia in support of anti-Bolsheviks.

MARCH 1919 - Third Communist International ("Comintern") formed.

JUNE 1919 - Treaty of Versailles signed.

NOVEMBER 1920 - Warren G. Harding elected president on platform opposed to U.S. membership in League of Nations.

MARCH 1921 - Lenin proclaims "New Economic Policy" (NEP).

NOVEMBER 1921 - Washington Naval Conference seeks to limit naval arms race.

APRIL 1922 - Mussolini granted dictatorial power in Italy.

First Soviet dealings with non-Bolshevik states at Genoa economic conference.

Rapallo Treaty with Germany.

DECEMBER 1922 - U.S.S.R. is officially formed.

JANUARY 1924 - Death of Lenin.

FEBRUARY-OCTOBER 1924 - Britain, Italy and France recognize U.S.S.R.

DECEMBER 1927 - Communist Party expels Trotsky, certifying Stalin's power in U.S.S.R.

AUGUST 1928 - Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Treaty) outlaws war.

OCTOBER 1928 - Stalin begins first "Five Year Plan" of "New Socialist Offensive," ending NEP and starting forced development in U.S.S.R.

OCTOBER 1929 - Great Depression begins.

JULY 1930 - London Naval Conference.

NOVEMBER 1932 - Franklin D. Roosevelt elected president.

JANUARY 1933 - **Hitler becomes chancellor. Nazis begin take-over of Germany.**

Purges in both Soviet Communist and Nazi Parties.

NOVEMBER 1933 - U.S. establishes diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

1934-36 - **Soviets begin support of collective service in Europe, exert pressure on Communists in other countries to work in "Popular Front" anti-fascist movements.**

JULY 1936 - Spanish Civil War begins.

OCTOBER 1936 - German-Italian agreement about Austria marks the beginning of the "Rome-Berlin" Axis.

SEPTEMBER 1938 - Munich agreement allows Hitler to annex part of Czechoslovakia.

AUGUST 1939 - Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact.

SEPTEMBER 1939 - Germany invades Poland. World War II begins.

JUNE 1941 - Hitler invades U.S.S.R.

DECEMBER 1941 - The Japanese attack on the U.S. brings war into the Pacific.

JUNE 1942 - Battle of Midway high-water mark of Japanese tide in Pacific.

AUGUST 1942 - Battle of Stalingrad begins. Ends in February, 1943 with German defeat.

NOVEMBER 1942 - U.S., British forces invade North Africa.

JULY 1943 - U.S., British forces invade Italy.

SEPTEMBER 1943 - Italians surrender.

NOVEMBER 28-DECEMBER 1, 1943: TEHERAN
Iran

Although the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union formed the "Grand Alliance" against the Nazis in 1941, it was not until the Conference at Teheran that the allied leaders met at the summit level. In Teheran, Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt planned military strategy for Hitler's defeat. They agreed on a second military front: the invasion of Normandy by American, British and Canadian forces in the spring of 1944, which would coincide with a Russian attack from the east. While the leaders touched on major post-war questions such as the reorganization of the League of Nations, Polish boundaries, independence for Iran, and the treatment of Germany after the war, they postponed decisions on these issues.

JUNE 1944 - "D-Day" —British Commonwealth and U.S. forces invade German-occupied Normandy.

FEBRUARY 4-11, 1945: YALTA
Soviet Union

When Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met at Yalta, a Russian resort town in the Crimea, Germany's surrender before the end of the year appeared to be assured. Post-war reorganization and territorial issues—especially concerning Germany and Poland—dominated the discussions. The leaders decided that American, British, French, and Soviet forces would occupy Germany and Poland in separate military zones. In Poland, the Communist-dominated provisional government in Lublin was to retain its power, but was to be joined by the exiled leadership then in London. All defeated or liberated nations were to hold free elections. Final military strategy was also planned, and Roosevelt secured Stalin's commitment to enter the war against Japan within two or three months after Germany's surrender. In return, the Russians would regain territories in the Far East to equal those lost in the Russo-Japanese War.

APRIL 1945 - Roosevelt dies, Harry S Truman becomes president.

San Francisco Conference begins planning for United Nations Organization.

MAY 1945 - Germany surrenders.

JULY 17-AUGUST 2, 1945: POTSDAM
Germany

Potsdam occurred after victory in Europe, but before victory in the Pacific. It involved Stalin's meeting with a new American president, Harry S Truman, and two British prime ministers: first Churchill and then Clement Attlee, (following his triumph in the British elections during the conference). The leaders reaffirmed their position on the German and Polish territorial decisions reached at Yalta. Further discussions covered the rehabilitation of France, and the treatment of Germany, German reparations, and the rebuilding of the

League of Nations. The Soviet Union again vowed to declare war on Japan and, on July 24, Truman informed Stalin of "a new weapon of unusual destructive force," referring to the first testing of an atomic bomb.

AUGUST 1945 - The Soviet Union declares war on Japan.

Japan declares cease-fire following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by U.S. atomic bombs.

SEPTEMBER 1945 - "V-J Day"—Japan officially surrenders, war ends.

1945-1948 - The Soviet Union imposes Soviet-style government on Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania.

MARCH 1947 - The Truman Doctrine signals advent of American policy to "contain" Soviet influence triggered by the Greek civil war.

JUNE 1947 - The Marshall Plan promises U.S. aid for rebuilding Europe.

FEBRUARY 1948 - Communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

APRIL 1948 - The Czechoslovakia/Berlin Blockade begins (ends September 30, 1949).

MAY 1948 - Israel is created.

APRIL 1949 - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is formed to strengthen military defenses against the Soviet Union.

SEPTEMBER 1949 - The U.S.S.R. successfully tests an atomic bomb.

OCTOBER 1949 - The new People's Republic of China emerges under Communist leadership following years of civil war.

JUNE 1950 - North Korean Communists invade South Korea.

NOVEMBER 1952 - Eisenhower is elected president.

MARCH 1953 - Stalin dies. Georgi Malenkov becomes premier. Khrushchev becomes general secretary of the party.

JULY 1953 - Korean War truce is signed.

FEBRUARY 1955 - Soviet Premier Malenkov is replaced by Nikolai Bulganin.

MAY 1955 - West Germany joins NATO.

The eastern bloc countries sign the Warsaw Pact.

The Austrian State Treaty is signed by the U.S., Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R., declaring the country permanently neutral.

JULY 18-23, 1955: GENEVA
Switzerland

After a ten-year hiatus marked by strained East-West relations, the "Big Four" powers—the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union—came together to discuss an agenda that consisted of three items. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Edgar Faure, and Nicolai Bulganin conferred on German unity, arms control, and diplomatic exchanges designed to ease Cold War tensions. Eisenhower discovered early in the meetings that Khrushchev (also present), not Bulganin, was the real power in the Soviet Union. The president proposed his bold "Open Skies" plan to allow each country overflights of each others' military sites. Despite the Soviets' vehement rejection of the plan, it served to make verification a focal point of arms control discussions at summits. The conference produced a directive to the foreign ministers to pursue post-summit negotiations on European security and German reunification, disarmament, and East-West contacts. The summit also generated a sense of optimism, the "spirit of Geneva," about the prospects for happier relations between the East and the West.

OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1956 - The Suez Crisis occurs when French, Israeli and British forces seize control of the Suez Canal.

Soviet troops crush anti-Soviet revolt in Hungary.

OCTOBER 1957 - The launching of Sputnik demonstrates Soviet technical capability.

MARCH 1958 - Khrushchev replaces Bulganin as Soviet premier consolidates power.

NOVEMBER 1958 - The Soviets threaten to make Berlin a demilitarized city in six months.

JANUARY 1959 - Fidel Castro comes to power in Cuba.

SEPTEMBER 15-27, 1959: CAMP DAVID
United States

The first bilateral summit involving the U.S. and the Soviet Union occurred as the result of miscommunication between Eisenhower and his staff, who extended an open invitation to the Soviet premier to visit Washington. When Khrushchev arrived, Eisenhower escorted him on a tour across the United States, a trip designed to convince the Soviet leader of the superiority of the American capitalist system. Meanwhile, the foreign ministers held meetings in Washington on disarmament, trade and credits, and a nuclear test ban. Later, Eisenhower and Khrushchev conferred for two days at Camp David, where the discussions focused on Soviet threats to contain the exodus of East Germans from partitioned Berlin, still under post-war military occupation by the Big Four. Khrushchev backed off on his demands in exchange for Eisenhower's agreement to visit Moscow.

MAY 1960 - American U-2 spy plane is shot down in Soviet territory and its pilot is captured.

MAY 16-17, 1960: PARIS
France

Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Harold Macmillan, and Charles de Gaulle met amid tension generated by the U-2 affair and renewed Soviet threats to sign a separate German peace treaty. Going into the meetings, the following issues were to be discussed: Germany and Berlin, disarmament, nuclear testing, and East-West relations. The talks collapsed in the opening session, however, when Khrushchev refused to participate without an apology from Eisenhower for the U-2 flight. The exchange that followed Khrushchev's departure established the principle of freedom for satellite surveillance in outer space. This was the last attempt to hold summits on an East-West multilateral basis.

NOVEMBER 1960 - John F. Kennedy is elected president.

APRIL 1961 - U.S.-backed Cuban emigres attempt assault at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba.

JUNE 3-4, 1961: VIENNA
Austria

The Kennedy-Khrushchev summit was exploratory for both leaders. The Soviet premier wished to assess his youthful, new adversary; the president wanted to size up Khrushchev and his intentions. Khrushchev's intention, Kennedy learned, was to seize Berlin if the flow of East Germans to the West was not cut off. In addition, disarmament and Laos were discussed. Both sides reaffirmed support for a neutral and independent Laotian government. The two leaders also agreed to "maintain contact on all questions of interest to the two countries for the whole world." For the next two years the two actively corresponded.

AUGUST 1961 -The Berlin Wall Crisis—building of the wall begins.

OCTOBER 1962 - The Cuban Missile Crisis brings the U.S. and Soviet Union to the brink of war.

AUGUST 1963 - The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is signed by the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R., prohibiting nuclear testing in outer space, the atmosphere and under water.

NOVEMBER 1963 - President Kennedy is assassinated; Lyndon Johnson becomes President.

OCTOBER 1964 - Premier Khrushchev falls from power. He is replaced by Leonid Brezhnev.

NOVEMBER 1964 - Lyndon Johnson wins presidential election.

APRIL 1965 - First U.S. combat troops begin significant involvement in Vietnam.

JUNE 23-25, 1967: GLASSBORO
United States

With little notice, President Johnson and Soviet Premier Brezhnev met in this quiet New Jersey town. The summit was prompted by the premier's attendance at the Fifth Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly to deal with the June War between Egypt and Israel. Johnson and Brezhnev discussed a number of issues: the Middle East crisis and arms shipments to that area, possible peace negotiations with North Vietnam, the non-proliferation treaty that was deadlocked in Geneva, and Russia's refinement and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (A.B.M.) system, which Johnson viewed as accelerating the arms race. Two weeks after the summit the two sides accepted the first two articles of the nonproliferation agreement.

FEBRUARY 1968 - The Tet Offensive in Vietnam helps turn American public sentiment against the war.

SUMMER 1968 - The Paris Peace Talks, aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict, begin.

NOVEMBER 1968 - Richard Nixon is elected president.

FEBRUARY 1972 - Nixon visits China to hold summit with Mao Zedong. Their "Shanghai Communique" reopens relations.

APRIL 1972 - U.S. responds to North Vietnamese escalation with attack on Hanoi and mines Haiphong.

MAY 22-30, 1972: MOSCOW
Soviet Union

In the first of three meetings between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, the United States wished to improve its prospects for ending the Vietnam War, and to conclude the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Agreement. Some of the sessions were marked by Soviet hostility, especially about the escalating U.S. role in Vietnam and the B-52 bombings of North Vietnam. The leaders discussed European security, commercial and economic relations, China, Vietnam, the Middle East, and arms control. By the end of the summit, nine treaties and agreements had been signed, including the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (now referred to as SALT I). Other agreements concerned cooperative efforts in science and technology, medicine and public health, protection of the environment, collaboration in space exploration, and avoidance of naval incidents at sea. The meeting concluded with an agreement to meet again.

DECEMBER 1972 - The U.S. launches the massive "Christmas Bombing Offensive" in Vietnam.

JANUARY 1973 - The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam is signed by North and South Vietnam.

APRIL 1973 - Nixon accepts responsibility for Watergate.

JUNE 18-25, 1973: WASHINGTON/ SAN CLEMENTE
United States

In largely ceremonial sessions in Washington and San Clemente, Nixon and Brezhnev signed agreements which had been negotiated beforehand. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had gone to Moscow in May to prepare for the summit and to reassure the Soviet leaders that Nixon was still firmly in command of the United States despite the growing Watergate scandal. In Moscow, Kissinger negotiated the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War which contained a pledge that the

two countries would make "serious efforts" to work out a "permanent" agreement on strategic offensive arms by the end of 1974. Nixon and Brezhnev signed eleven agreements and protocols in Washington and San Clemente, and concluded their meeting with a joint communique and agreed to meet again.

OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1973 - Egypt and Israel engage in the Yom Kippur War, triggering major military alerts by the Superpowers. In November, Egypt and Israel sign U.S.-sponsored cease-fire.

JUNE 27-JULY 3, 1974: MOSCOW/YALTA
Soviet Union

Nixon was preoccupied by Watergate and not at his best when he met with Kosygin in the Soviet Union. No progress was made on Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) issues and, consequently, the two leaders decided to hold an "interim" summit to complete their discussions on SALT. Still, Nixon and Kosygin signed numerous agreements: Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (A.B.M.) Systems (reducing from two to one the number of A.B.M. systems permitted); the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (Treaty and Protocol on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons—never ratified by the Senate); Long-Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation; and agreements on cooperation in energy, housing and artificial heart research. Nixon and Kosygin also agreed to open new consulates in Kiev and New York, and issued a joint communique setting the date for the "interim" summit.

AUGUST 1974 - Nixon resigns the presidency as a result of the Watergate affair. Gerald Ford becomes president.

NOVEMBER 23-24, 1974: VLADIVOSTOK
Soviet Union

The Vladivostok meeting was held in keeping with plans made at the Moscow summit to hold an "interim summit" to work on SALT. The United States, now under Ford's leadership, wished to reaffirm continuity in the U.S. position on detente and cooperation, and to continue the SALT process. The first day's discussion established a framework for further SALT negotiations, and limits were set for strategic launchers. On the second day, international issues were discussed: the Cyprus crisis, the Middle East, security in Europe, and U.S.-Soviet cooperative ties. The next summit, to be held in the U.S. in 1975, was planned (but postponed repeatedly and never held).

APRIL 1975 - Final withdrawal of American personnel from Vietnam. Saigon falls to North Vietnam.

JULY 30 and AUGUST 2, 1975: HELSINKI
Finland

Ford, Brezhnev and the leaders of thirty-three other nations met in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Accords. In addition to participating in the signing ceremonies, Ford and Brezhnev met twice and discussed SALT verification, U.S. cruise missiles and the Soviet backfire bomber. The remaining issues of contention on SALT were referred to the foreign ministerial level (where no progress was made on their resolution).

NOVEMBER 1976 - Jimmy Carter wins the presidential election.

SEPTEMBER 1978 - The Camp David Summit between the U.S., Egypt and Israel culminates in the signing of the "Framework for Peace" between Egypt and Israel.

JANUARY 1979 - U.S. normalizes relations with the People's Republic of China.

FEBRUARY-AUGUST 1979 - The Iranian Revolution begins. The shah leaves Iran; the Ayatollah Khomeini takes over the provisional government.

JUNE 15-18, 1979: VIENNA
Austria

Jimmy Carter and an ailing Leonid Brezhnev met in Vienna to sign the SALT II agreement, marking the conclusion of seven years of negotiations to limit strategic weapons. Despite the achievement that the agreement signified, the occasion was purely ceremonial. U.S.-Soviet relations, which had been deteriorating since the Nixon era, suffered from the tensions produced by the overthrow of the shah in Iran, Soviet rumblings in Central America, and domestic economic worries.

JULY 1979 - The Sandinistas take over Nicaragua.

NOVEMBER 1979 - The U.S. embassy in Teheran is seized by government-supported radicals. Fifty-three Americans are taken hostage.

DECEMBER 1979 - Soviet troops invade Afghanistan.

JANUARY 1980 - Carter asks the Senate to delay consideration of SALT II in response to invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

Carter imposes an embargo on grain and high technology sales to the Soviet Union.

Carter announces a boycott of the Summer Olympics in Moscow.

SEPTEMBER 1980 - Poland's trade unions consolidate into a single organization, Solidarity.

NOVEMBER 1980 - Ronald Reagan is elected.

JANUARY 1981 - Fifty-two American hostages are released from Iran after 444 days of captivity.

JANUARY 1981 - At his first presidential news conference, Reagan denounces the Soviets for aspiring to "world revolution and a one-world Socialist or Communist state."

OCTOBER 1981 - Reagan reveals plans for rearming U.S. military.

NOVEMBER 1981 - The U.S. and Soviet Union begin negotiations in Geneva on nuclear missiles in Europe. They are far from agreement on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF).

JUNE 1982 - The U.S. and U.S.S.R. begin Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations in Geneva.

NOVEMBER 1982 - Soviet Premier Brezhnev dies. Yuri Andropov becomes the first KGB chief to become Soviet general secretary.

MARCH 1983 - Reagan delivers a speech in which he refers to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."

Reagan launches the Strategic Defense Initiative, (SDI). Senator Edward Kennedy refers to the plan as "reckless 'Star Wars' schemes," coining its popular nickname.

NOVEMBER 1983 - West German Parliament votes to accept deployment of U.S. Pershing missiles in response to new Soviet intermediate range missiles.

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1983 - Andropov suspends talks on INF in response to the deployment of the Pershing IIs in Germany.

Soviets break off START talks.

FEBRUARY 1984 - Andropov dies. Konstantin Chernenko becomes general secretary.

MARCH 1985 - Chernenko dies. He is succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Geneva Arms Control Talks resume.

APRIL-NOVEMBER 1985 - Gorbachev and Reagan engage in a public diplomacy campaign leading to a summit. Reagan focuses on offensive weapons, Gorbachev on SDI.

NOVEMBER 19-21, 1985: GENEVA
Switzerland

After five years of harsh rhetoric, Soviet and American relations acquired a more businesslike tone when Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev held their first summit in Geneva. The meeting produced little change in the major arms control issues, especially in Reagan's

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which the Soviets wished to strictly limit. Nevertheless, the communique that was issued following the meeting called for focused arms control talks in two areas. It cited a 50 percent reduction in both sides' nuclear weapons and a separate agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe; no mention of SDI was included. The summit was viewed by many as a "fresh start" for both countries. Two more summit meetings were announced, as were "regular meetings" between the U.S. secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister, and plans for cultural exchanges were initiated.

JANUARY 1986 - Gorbachev proposes a compromise on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) as part of a three-stage plan to eliminate nuclear arms before the end of the century.

Reagan counters Gorbachev's plan with a proposal to abandon medium-range missiles by 1990.

OCTOBER 11-12, 1986: REYKJAVIK
Iceland

Meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik had been officially billed as a "pre-summit" to a formal summit scheduled to take place in the United States. Before the president's departure, administration officials emphasized that they did not expect substantive changes from the sessions, but hoped that such a meeting would spark a conclusion to formal arms reduction agreements that were part of the on going START negotiations in Geneva. The leaders, however, discussed major elements of a sweeping new arms reduction plan, and the meeting broke down over Gorbachev's demand for a 10-year moratorium on SDI testing, a requirement that Reagan refused to agree upon. The encounter at Reykjavik raised concerns over future U.S.-Soviet summits, and the wisdom of discussing new programs without extensive advance planning and consultations.

1987 - Gorbachev announces policies of "glasnost" and "perestroika."

DECEMBER 8-10, 1987: WASHINGTON
United States

After the experience at Reykjavik, Ronald Reagan did not wish to enter into another meeting with Gorbachev without a tangible agreement in his hip pocket. That agreement, it turned out, was the INF treaty banning all intermediate-range nuclear missiles, including the U.S. Pershing II and the Soviet SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles. Gorbachev, who, until the summit, had demanded linkage of any arms agreement to the future of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), signed the treaty without any SDI provisions. The Washington meeting also signaled a return to the more practical discussions the two leaders had begun in Geneva. Reagan and Gorbachev engaged in confrontational talks on issues of importance to both sides, including Afghanistan and human rights, and, in the end, they agreed to disagree as part of their ongoing dialogue.

Unit 3:

Adversarial Summits, 1955-1987

Key Ideas

- After starting as multilateral meetings among the great powers, most of the U.S.-Soviet summits since 1955 have been bilateral.
- The pattern of the Superpower summits has been irregular. Periods of frequent summits have been followed by periods with few or no meetings.
- The bilateral form of summits reflects the military capability of the United States and the Soviet Union.
- Most U.S.-Soviet summits reflect and reinforce the nature of the overall relationship, rather than change it.

U.S. Navy, Courtesy Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

Eisenhower and Khrushchev's summit at Camp David in 1959 began an era of bilateral meetings between the Superpowers. But the meeting is probably best remembered for the leaders' tour across the United States, about which historian Stephen Ambrose observes in the video program.

> *Ike was asked at a press conference before Khrushchev came over for the Camp David meetings, "What do you want this man here for? Why is he coming?"*
> *And Ike said, "I want him to see, I want to get him in a helicopter and fly him up to Camp David. I want to show him all of those houses down there. And I want to show him all of those highways. And I want to show him what a great country this is."*
> *Khrushchev was totally unimpressed. He said, "All those individual houses, that is just a waste. And all of those cars—Americans are always trying to get to someplace that they aren't. In Russia everyone is happy where they are so we don't need roads and cars."*

Background Essay

As the fourth decade of postwar summitry winds down, the historical record of the U.S.-Soviet summit meetings is a mixed one.

On the positive side, this dialogue at the summit does continue despite fundamental disagreement on economic and political organization and, above all, on the proper relationship between a citizen and his government. Superpower summitry is by now an assumption in international relations, since every postwar American president and every general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party who has served more than a few months have participated in such meetings. In fact, successful participation in a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting is by now seen as a "rite of passage" for American presidents, and presumably for Soviet general secretaries as well. Some summit meetings have seen significant agreements signed, while others have at least symbolized changes in the pattern of relations between the countries

or helped shape the pattern of specific negotiations.

The negative side of the ledger shows entries as well. The meetings have been irregular. Though no major conflicts between the Superpowers have taken place, U.S.-Soviet summitry has not stopped the growth of their arsenals. Nor has it avoided the often dangerous friction between the Superpowers over various regional hotspots from Central Europe to Central America, the Middle East to Southeast Asia.

From this mixed record, however, an overview of postwar summitry does point out certain patterns that have emerged.

The schedule of meetings has indeed been erratic. Periods with frequent summits have been followed by prolonged periods with few meetings or none at all. Khrushchev met with American presidents four times within six years, annually between 1959 and 1961. However, Eisenhower's aborted Paris meeting of 1960 and Kennedy's Vienna meeting the next year both ended badly; and only one exploratory U.S.-Soviet summit meeting was held in the next eleven years. As part of detente, an attempt to define and maintain a consistent, stable and less confrontational relationship between the Superpowers, Presidents Nixon and Ford participated in five summits in a period of about three years. But the policy did not yield the long-range reductions in tension hoped for in its original design, and the relationship again soured over issues of trade, human rights, and the Soviets increasing aggressiveness in supporting insurgencies around the world. As a result, only one summit meeting took place between 1975 and 1985, when a pattern of regular summits reemerged.

Furthermore, after starting as multilateral conferences of great powers—five of the first six summits were such meetings—these meetings are now almost always bilateral. Eisenhower held the first bilateral summit in 1959 but it was virtually an accident, the by-product of an unanticipated invitation to America for

(both): Nixon Project, National Archives

Detente, the easing of Soviet-American relations which began during the Kennedy and Johnson years, took a giant step forward during Nixon's administration. Brezhnev and Nixon met three times in about two years despite Soviet opposition to America's role in Vietnam. Enthusiastic crowds welcomed both Brezhnev's visit to Washington in 1973 (top photo) and Nixon's visit to Moscow a year later (bottom photo).

Khrushchev. Ike ended up accompanying the general secretary on a tour of America, designed to impress him with American accomplishment. In addition, the two leaders actually held more substantive discussions than Ike had expected, doing more than merely planning for the "Big Four" meeting in Paris the next year. However, since Kennedy met alone with Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961, the only exception to the bilateral pattern was Ford's meeting with Brezhnev at the forum of the multinational Helsinki Accords in 1975; and even on this occasion, there were additional bilateral discussions.

This bilateral form of meetings reflects the unique military power of the two nations, with their immense arsenals of conventional and nuclear forces and their worldwide network of interests and relationships. It also reflects another assumption of the 1950s and 1960s: that the Superpower military rivalry reflects a competitive relationship across the board. This assumption is now open to debate.

Thirty years ago, the bilateral relationship also reflected economic reality. It seemed to symbolize a nonviolent competition between the two greatest economic powers on earth, each espousing a different system. During the past two decades, reality has changed. The dynamism of the non-socialist economies of the European community and of Japan and other emerging Asian economies has come to challenge the assumption of Superpower economic authority. In fact, developments outside the Superpower arena may have settled arguments about the relative effectiveness of the competing systems, as rates of growth in the industrialized democracies and among the non-socialist economies of Asia have outstripped those of the socialist nations. This situation suggests that the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will be increasingly affected by their economic relationships with other nations. If so, this decoupling of military and economic power suggests that some multilateral economic forum involving not only the Superpowers but also other economically powerful nations may need to be developed.

Such a change would have to be carefully undertaken, however, because it would challenge the apparent parity with the U.S. which bilateral summitry has come to symbolize for so many Soviets. The bilateral structure, symbolizing recognition of its Superpower status, has been an important element in justifying the enormous sacrifices demanded of the people of the Soviet Union over the past three generations. Given this emotional factor in the relationship, it may be difficult for the Soviet leadership to move in any area away from this pattern of bilateral dealings with the United States.

Understanding this bilateral relationship at the summit also helps explain the irregular pattern of U.S.-Soviet summitry. Two factors, sometimes interrelated, contribute to this. First, each nation goes through periods in which its domestic concerns occupy most of its leadership's energy. Whenever such periods within the two countries coincide, summits are unlikely. The second factor is the character of the overall Superpower relationship in any given period. No matter how much attention summit meetings attract, they are only one element in an increasingly complex relationship. Most U.S.-Soviet summits reflect and reinforce the nature of the overall relationship at a given moment, rather than significantly changing it.

In reality, the focus on domestic concerns often interacts with problems in the relationship to change the rhythm of meetings. One example occured in the mid-1960s. The crisis over the Berlin Wall had strained the relationship between the Superpowers; the Cuban Missile Crisis had pushed them to the brink of war. Thus, relations were difficult at best entering a period when the leadership of both nations turned to the challenge of solving domestic problems. After the ouster of Khrushchev, Brezhnev's domestic problems were the primary concern of the Soviet leadership during a period when Soviet international maneuvering was made very tricky by the American involvement in Vietnam, internal efforts at liberalization among Warsaw Pact nations, and the turbulence of China's Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile, America's domestic concerns—digesting and managing the rapid changes resulting from the civil rights movement, President Kennedy's assassination, the Great Society program, and Vietnam—also consumed most of the energy of its leadership.

These interlocking factors contributed to the break in Superpower summitry between 1961 and President Johnson's meeting with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey, six years later. Furthermore, in terms of the norms of postwar U.S.-Soviet summitry, Glassboro was an anomaly for a number of reasons. It was not the result of lengthy planning but was called on short notice. Though it dealt with a wide range of issues, including the nature of the basic relationship between the Superpowers, it was called specifically to try to contain the effects of the Six-Day War in the Middle East. And, like Geneva in 1955, it was held in a period of some American uncertainty about the precise pattern of Soviet leadership as it was evolving in the post-Khrushchev era. In fact, it was the only top-level meeting in which the sitting Soviet General Secretary did not participate.

Another period illustrating the relationship between domestic and international concerns is the early 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 had chilled the Superpower relationship. When Ronald Reagan took office just over a year later, he did not want to go to a summit until he could negotiate there from a position of American strength. Only after he had completed dealing with a changed domestic economic agenda which would permit a build-up of the American military was he willing to meet with his Soviet counterpart. During this same period, the Soviet leadership

went through an unprecedented period of instability. The aged Brezhnev's lethargic final years were followed by the death of his two successors within twenty-eight months. This was shocking in a country which had seen only three general secretaries between the time Stalin had assumed the role in the turbulent days of the revolution and Brezhnev's death some six decades later. As a result of this combination of events, Reagan's first term in office was the first full term since Truman's in which no U.S.-Soviet summit meeting took place. In fact, it was late in 1985 before both Reagan and the vigorous new general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, were ready to meet in Geneva.

Afghanistan illustrates an important aspect of the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. No events influence the patterns of summitry more than American reactions to the Soviets' use of military force shortly after summit meetings where a more amicable "spirit" seemed to have been generated. Three such Soviet military actions produced American reactions, public and official, which led to a break in the summitry pattern. When the Soviets crushed the Hungarian revolt in 1956, it undermined the good will resulting from Eisenhower's first summit. Consequently, no summit meeting was held for four years, until the almost-accidental Camp David meeting. The Warsaw Pact forces' move into Czechoslovakia in 1968 not only ended the "spirit of Holly Bush" (the house in Glassboro where that meeting was held) but also caused the cancellation at the last minute of an arms control meeting to be held in the Soviet Union. No summit occurred for another five years. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended the Carter Administration's plans for more regular summits, assured the indefinite postponement of U.S. Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty signed at that year's summit meeting, and contributed to a six-year break in summitry. Add to these episodes the Berlin and Cuban crises which took place within a year and a half of the Kennedy summit—after which there were no meetings until



(both) Pete Souza, The White House

Face-to-face meetings between leaders involve dealing with both the cooperative and confrontational aspects of the relationship. Striking a balance between the two can, at times, be difficult. In Vienna, a sense of strained cooperation pervaded the sessions between Carter and Brezhnev (top photo); while those between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik revealed the edgy side of confrontation (bottom photo).

Y.R. Okamoto, Courtesy Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

Glassboro six years later—and the irregular pattern of these meetings becomes more understandable.

As noted, summits are only one element in a complicated relationship. The periods of more frequent summits are usually those of special efforts to stabilize the Superpower relationship, often by expanding the number of agreements which help define relations between the countries. Especially in such periods, the scheduling of summits has proved an instrument of great value to leaders of both countries in energizing and mobilizing their bureaucracies toward such an end. In fact, one argument often put forward to justify more regular summit meetings is that they offer a leader the opportunity to influence the large bureaucracies of modern governments, inevitably slow to move without such pressure. This argument is plausible, though it must take into account the unexpected problems which may appear in other areas of the relationship, such as the apparent Soviet tendency to invade its neighboring states—at times inconvenient to maintaining better relations.

Summitry points up an interesting problem relating to this relationship between leaders and bureaucracies. Summits are moments of extraordinary visibility, especially for either leader and his immediate staff; the intensity of modern media coverage assures this, at least where there is a free press. Consequently, leaders going into summits face an enormous pressure to prepare thoroughly and to produce something of substance at the meetings. Especially in the Western democracies, with their energetic private media, there is a tendency to feel that a summit which reaches no agreement has been a failure. Once there, the leader does feel pressure to produce public accomplishments; as a result, of course, few summits are held without some agreements, negotiated ahead of time, which

The accelerating arms race was in the fore when Lyndon Johnson met with Alexei Kosygin at Glassboro. In the video program, former presidential advisor Walt Rostow tells of the president before going into his session with the premier:

> *He sat up most of the night. He called me very early in the morning and said, "I want to say something, in general, and this is what I want to say."*
> *He said, "We, the Soviet Union and the United States, are the two eldest children of a big family. The children are growing up and getting too big to spank. We have a responsibility to help keep order in the family. Therefore we must do three things: we must, first, set a good example in our relations with each other. Secondly, where we can, we want to create a framework which helps the other members of the family keep the peace. And third, if they decide they want to fight, they fight with sticks and stones, and not atomic weapons."*
> *And I listened. He said, 'Look, you've got to tell me whether this makes sense or not."*
> *I said, "Well, I wish I had thought of it."*

In addition to participating in the signing ceremonies in Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ford and Brezhnev met twice to discuss SALT verification, U.S. cruise missiles and the Soviet backfire bomber. (left to right) Secretary of State Kissinger, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev confer outside the Soviet Embassy in August, 1975.

Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library

can be signed for the cameras.

This pressure of summit deadlines, and the high profile of the meetings themselves, certainly means that leaders, and the bureaucrats who support them, feel driven to produce something on schedule. But after such a meeting, the participants may feel that they have "passed the examination" in international affairs. A natural reaction is to move on to dealing with the next test on the wide-ranging agenda of leadership, whether foreign or domestic, which was deferred when attention was so intensely focused on the summit. Consequently, though summits may be valuable tools to goad a bureaucracy into action, the very investment of time and effort they demand may make it difficult to assure that sufficent energy is committed to guarantee successful follow-through. Hence, a summit may produce a surge of activity in dealing with the issues it is to raise, followed by too little continuity of follow-through to make the most of the meeting.

Media coverage is more of a problem to the democratic leader at a summit than to anyone able to control the media at home. The scrutiny of Western media, free of governmental control and often playing an adversarial role to government, only intensifies the tendency of presidents to concentrate effort on the summit and the period leading up to it. With relatively little media scrutiny, and without the public debate it feeds, a general secretary appears to have more flexibility than his democratic counterpart.

Such a situation does have some advantages. Leaders of totalitarian states do seem capable of changing direction more rapidly than can those in democracies, and of cutting their losses more easily if a policy fails. But their centralized systems suffer from an even greater bureaucratic entrenchment and inertia than do democracies, and they have a more difficult time in dealing creatively with new ideas, whether they develop at home or abroad, whether presented at summits or in the broader context of the overall relationship.

Every American president who has gone to a summit must have wished sometimes for the apparent authority and flexibility of response which general secretaries seem to possess. However, the growing Soviet debate about restructuring their entire society suggests the potential "downside risks" of such an assumption about a centralized political system. Patterns of thought and behavior can be institutionalized by the bureaucracies of state and party, and continue without challenge for long periods of time by the bureaucratic momentum of the centralized structure. There is a resulting tendency to reinforce judgments which conform to these assumptions, however erroneous they might be. Leaders of authoritarian states, who rise to power in such an environment, may find little in the system to challenge their personal interpretation of situations; the result may be serious errors in judgment resulting from a misreading of circumstances or their adversaries' capabilities or interests. On the other hand, the vigorous public debate in a democracy, though it can limit a leader's freedom of movement in some circumstances, offers some real compensating advantages. It can bring new ideas to attention

and focus thinking about them; it reduces the danger of a leader's substituting personal judgment for systematic decision-making; and it can help develop public support for policies as they evolve.

The nature of the American constitutional system means that this element in governance is particularly important. No president can expect to make a deal at the summit which cannot be sold at home. No more vivid example of this can be found than Woodrow Wilson: surely he held at Versailles as powerful a position as any American leader at any summit, yet he was unable to sell the U.S. Senate and the American people on his vision of the League of Nations as the linchpin of a new international system. Nor need the goal be so visionary or original to face problems; even agreements which seem logical at the time can be caught up in the play of a democracy's turbulent domestic politics. This happened with the SALT II treaty, built upon the work of previous administrations, which President Carter signed, only to see the invasion of Afghanistan undermine his work. However he must have disliked doing so, Carter himself asked for a deferral of consideration of the treaty by the Senate.

For all their frustrations with decision-making in an open society, democratic leaders are insulated by the very tensions of their process from making some of the massive mistakes which dictatorial power has allowed their totalitarian counterparts to make. This is as true of summits as of any other aspect of the relationship.

An example of this difference can be found in results of the Vienna summit in 1961. Optimistic about his country's capacities after the successes in its space program, and apparently misreading Kennedy's determination, Khrushchev embarked on a provocative course of action by building the Berlin Wall and placing offensive missiles in Cuba. This led the Superpowers to the brink of direct conflict in late 1962. Kennedy, apparently more accurate in his assessment of his adversary's intentions, used reports of his impressions at Vienna to help build political support for firmness in dealing with the Soviets. The toughness and tenacity of Kennedy's response to Khrushchev's new activities in Cuba apparently surprised the Soviet leader, and led to several days of dangerous confrontation in the Caribbean. In the end, a deal was made which required the Soviets to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for an American pledge not to invade the island. The crisis left Kennedy more popular at home than before, with broad public endorsement for great firmness in dealing with the Soviets. In the U.S.S.R. the result began a chain of events which led to Khrushchev's fall from power and his replacement as general secretary by Leonid Brezhnev.

About the Video Program

ADVERSARIAL SUMMITS, 1955-1987, deals with more than three decades of U.S.-Soviet summitry, between Dwight Eisenhower's first postwar summit held in Geneva in 1955 with Khrushchev and Bulganin of the U.S.S.R. and the premiers of Great Britain and France, and the current cycle of regular meetings between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.

A significant factor in the years since 1955 has been the irregular pattern of Superpower summits. Cycles of frequent meetings have alternated with periods of up to six years with no meetings at all. The program points out factors which contributed to this irregularity.

In the context of the history of the period and the framework of the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship, actual participants in summit planning for each president give brief reports on aspects of the presidential summits with which they are concerned: Walt Rostow on the summit meetings of Kennedy and Johnson; Brent Scowcroft on the Nixon and Ford meetings; Robert Hunter on Carter's single summit; and Kenneth Adelman (who was taped after the conference to update the material) on Reagan's first three. Stephen Ambrose adds useful information to the discussion of the Eisenhower period.

In addition, the panelists discuss ways in which summitry affects the relationship between a leader and the substantial bureaucracy of the modern state, especially in planning for a summit and in effectively following through on its work. Particularly important to this discussion are contributions from Rostow, Scowcroft and Alton Frye.

Questions to Consider

1. How different are U.S.-Soviet summits in the postwar years from the wartime summits of the 1940s?

2. The American-Soviet relationship of the late 1950s and 1960s reflected not only the military power of the two nations but also expectations of their continued economic superiority over other nations. What developments over the last fifteen to twenty years have caused this to change? What are the implications of the changes for the U.S.-Soviet relationships and for summitry as well?

3. U.S.-Soviet summitry has followed an irregular pattern. For example, Presidents Nixon and Ford held three summits in just over three years, but there had been only one summit in the eleven years before this cycle began in 1972, and only one in the decade following its end in 1975. Look over the chronology of U.S.-Soviet summits. What factors have contributed to the irregular pattern of these meetings?

4. Domestic concerns often interact with problems in the Superpower relationship. What problems at home were American and Soviet leaders facing during the time periods 1961-1967 and the early 1980s? What events further complicated the relationship?

5. The following terms, issues or events are associated with specific summits. Identify each and its significance to a summit or summits. Use the chronology of U.S.-Soviet summits for help.

- The "Big Three"
- The escalation of the war in Vietnam
- Invasion of Afghanistan
- "Open Skies"
- Berlin
- Watergate
- Anti-Ballistic Missiles Systems (A.B.M.)
- Strategic Defense Initiatives (S.D.I.)

6. There is discussion in the video about the advantages and disadvantages that leaders of democracies and authoritarian states have when they meet at the summit level. What are some of these advantages and disadvantages? Your answer should consider such issues as the role of leaders in their respective societies, public opinion, and media.

7. Though the pattern of adversarial summits in the postwar years continues, in the late 1980s Americans are seeing a new style of Soviet leadership in Mikhail Gorbachev. How do you expect this new situation to alter the U.S.-Soviet relationship, especially as it is played out at the summit?

8. In the video, Walt Rostow talks about the importance of follow-through after a summit. What actions can a leader take before and after a summit to assure proper follow-through?

9. Most U.S.-Soviet summits reflect and reinforce the nature of the overall relationship rather than change it. How did the following summits reflect the posture of the Superpower relationship?

- Washington 1987
- Paris 1960
- Potsdam 1945
- Moscow/Yalta 1974

Suggested Readings

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Unit 4:

Basic Issues in U.S.-Soviet Summitry

Key Ideas

- Four categories of topics—arms control, regional issues, bilateral issues, and human rights—dominate U.S.-Soviet summit agendas.
- Superpower summits are valuable in helping to define relations between the two countries, but most summits do little to change the relationship significantly.
- Since technology has made travel and communications easier, national leaders frequently hold summit meetings with one another. Even taken only in terms of their bilateral relationship, a U.S.-Soviet summit may not have as far-reaching an effect as a summit between either leader and the head of another state.

Jimmy Carter Library

Summitry is not limited to American and Soviet leaders. Indeed, some summits involving the president and other foreign leaders have had a greater impact on promoting peace. Nixon's visit to China in 1972 (top photo) changed the chilly course of American policy toward the world's largest Communist state, while Jimmy Carter's 1978 trilateral meeting with Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel (bottom photo) led to an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, however ephemeral its effects proved to be.

Background Essay

Through more than three decades, the broad categories of issues dealt with in the U.S.-Soviet summits of the era since World War II have been relatively consistent. Of course, the balancing act between the cooperative and confrontational is a constant. And, though the specific form of issues on the agenda may change from summit to summit, the broad clustering of concerns relating to that balance has remained generally consistent since Eisenhower's first meeting laid out the basic agenda for postwar summitry in 1955.

The topics discussed at summits can be put into four broad categories.

Regional Issues. This is the euphemism for local points of

conflict—whether directly involving the Superpowers themselves or their allies—which might blow up into more dangerous confrontation between nations with conflicting global interests and relationships. At Geneva in 1955 through Vienna in 1961, the issue was Germany, especially the status of Berlin; at Glassboro in 1967, the Middle East; by the Reagan summits in the late 1980s, they were primarily Central America and Afghanistan. Change though they may over time, a constant of postwar Superpower summitry has been a concern for preventing such issues from escalating into direct confrontations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

Arms control is another issue which changes in detail but which has remained of constant concern since Eisenhower's first meeting. It has been dealt with in a number of ways. Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal of 1955, sought to deal with the core of the issue, the underlying fears and tensions which were used to justify the growing arsenals of nuclear weapons. Ike hoped to slow that growth by reducing the chance of a surprise attack by giving each Superpower the right to fly over the other's military sites which might be used to launch such an attack. Though rejected out of hand by Khrushchev at Geneva—a move which gave Eisenhower the clear indication that it was Khrushchev, not Bulganin, who was the true heir to Stalin's power within the Soviet Union—this proposal established verification as an issue in all subsequent arms control discussions.

In the years since 1955 a number of other approaches to this item on the summit agendas, always technically complicated and often arcane, have been tried. Each approach produced its own acronym. One approach produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, designed to limit defensive weapons so as to lock the Superpower nuclear relationship into a pattern of "Mutual Assured Destruction." (This concept assumes that nuclear attack by one power would lead to such destructive retaliation by the other

National Archives: U.S. Army Signal Corps

Wartime security for the meeting between Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt at Yalta in 1945 limited coverage of the event to a small military press corps (top photo). But by 1967 when Johnson and Kosygin met at Glassboro (bottom photo), the media industry had burgeoned and summits had become major press events.

Y.R. Okamoto, Courtesy Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

that no one would consider such an exchange, resulting in greater care and responsibility in managing these weapons by both parties.) In the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) treaties, the goal was limiting the number of specific weapons and/or delivery systems each side could have, hoping to reduce the pressure to continue to expand the arsenals. In the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, signed at the Washington summit in 1987, for the first time a whole class of delivery systems was eliminated. This approach of actually reducing weapons is also a premise of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) negotiations.

Especially since the advent in the late 1960s of increasingly sophisticated systems to deliver multiple nuclear warheads with a single missile, this complicated issue has tended to dominate summit agendas. This has also been the issue on which Soviet propaganda and "public diplomacy" has increasingly tended to focus, taking advantage of the great power of public opinion in Western democracies to play on apprehension about weapons of such destructive capacity.

Bilateral issues. These issues, dealing with details of the direct interaction between the two powers, have been constants on the agendas of postwar summits. This is the area in which progress has most often been shown, even at summits where little else concrete is accomplished. Again, Eisenhower showed the way, establishing at Geneva the beginnings of a system of cultural exchanges between the nations. Various trade and cultural issues are often discussed at summits, frequently with some prenegotiated agreements signed there. This category includes confidence-building efforts at improving communications between the Superpowers, such as the development of "hot line" systems designed to reduce the chances of accidental conflict.

In this category also falls one of the most imprecise of all agenda topics: the essential framework of the Superpower relationship, the basic way in which the two parties behave toward each other and how they link together the various issues in this category and within the other categories. Though this topic has been discussed at a number of summits, little has been accomplished to change the behavior of the parties. Even so, theoretical discussions of this framework may well be an important instrument in helping leaders relate to each other, in "mapping" one another's minds.

There is an interesting sidebar to this area of direct relations between the two nations. In an imprecise way, despite all the other factors beyond their control at a summit, the human relationship between the leaders of the Superpowers may help play a role in their diplomacy. Sometimes, the chemistry seems wrong: one could hardly imagine two men less superficially alike than the cool Kennedy and volatile Khrushchev, and the miscommunication at their summit meeting seemed to certify the problems of this difference. Yet, there is no guarantee that seemingly comfortable relationships produce any change in the tension of the relationship between the Superpowers. Nixon, who seems to have gotten along reasonably well with Brezhnev, still reported very tough negotiations held shortly after moments of apparently genuine human warmth between the men. Still, the time spent together by two leaders who have risen to unique positions of power, even in systems so different, may have a subtle influence on the course of their discussions, not only of the ultimate relationship between their nations but also of other issues.

Human rights. Especially since the 1970s, when these issues became increasingly central to the American foreign policy debate in the Carter Administration, they have grown in importance to U.S.-Soviet summitry. Traditionally, the expression of these issues has dealt largely with the challenge of opening up the Soviet system, which many Americans see as crucial to any long-range stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Again, Eisenhower was ahead of this curve, his "Open Skies" proposal would have worked only if some loosening of control within the Soviet system had taken place. As he said later, when he proposed reoffering that proposal at the Paris summit, "Open societies in the day of present weapons are the only answer."

These issues can cut both ways; for example, the Soviets attack the American system for its lack of guaranteed "economic rights" whenever the issue of their limitation of political rights is criticized. But human rights questions remain a point of major vulnerability for the Soviet system to public opinion in large parts of the world and prove consistently uncomfortable to them.

The mix of these agenda items from summit to summit varies. It was a regional question—that of Berlin, which had been a flashpoint of potential East-West conflict at least since the Soviets instituted the Berlin blockade in 1948—which dominated early postwar summitry through 1961. At Glassboro in 1967, it was another regional issue, the Middle East, which was the basis for the meeting. Beginning in the 1970s, it has been arms control issues which have tended to dominate other issues at summits; Reykjavik is a case in point.

In fact, recent Soviet public pronouncements concerning summit agendas have increasingly focused on arms control issues. This reinforces the legitimate concern of Western public opinion about the danger posed by the vast arsenals of nuclear weapons now in place, while deflecting attention from other areas, like human rights, where the Soviets may not fare as well in Western public opinion. Media attention often reinforces this pressure, making it difficult for American representatives to assure discussions balanced among the various items of a wide-ranging agenda at summit meetings. As a result, even though a wide range of items is normally discussed at the summit, attention often ends up being focused on the progress, or lack of it, on issues dealing with arms control.

Difficulty in managing summit agendas is one of the results of the

vast media coverage of summitry. U.S.-Soviet summits are now media events of worldwide importance. Perhaps nothing but an Olympics or an American presidential election can stir up such widespread media interest as a summit. In the era of instantaneous satellite communications, the public relations aspects of summitry sometimes threaten to overwhelm the substantive private discussions.

Summitry is now the ultimate stage for public diplomacy, the competition for public approval around the world. In such a contest, Soviet leaders would seem to have some initial advantage, given their control of their domestic media and its output into international media. Yet, this advantage may be illusory. The aggressive role played by the media in American political life, including the election process, increasingly means that any American leader going to a summit will have mastered the media, or at least become comfortable with them. It is yet to be demonstrated that the Soviet process of selecting its leaders, however useful it may be at managing the party and state bureaucracies, will produce figures consistently appealing to viewers and listeners around the world. Certainly Gorbachev, of all the general secretaries to hold the

National Archives, U.S. Army Signal Corps

Nixon Project, National Archives

Courtesy of Gerald R. Ford Library

The devastation of Hiroshima (top left) engraved the spectre of nuclear holocaust on the world's consciousness, and placed arms control at the center of summit agendas. Face-to-face meetings between the Superpowers often relieve public nervousness about modern weaponry, whether the meetings culminate in formal treaties such as SALT I signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow in 1972 (top right), or in joint communiques to continue talks on strategic weapons as in Vladivostok by Ford and Brezhnev in 1974 (bottom right).

The Middle East, Berlin and Central America are areas associated with regional issues, longtime global "hotspots" which have involved either of the summit parties, directly or indirectly. Other areas such as Afghanistan, Vietnam, and southern Africa have raised serious questions about the respective roles of the Superpowers in these regions (all shown in dark areas). Yet for all the concerns they raise, regional issues are less frequently addressed at American-Soviet summits, as former presidential adviser Brent Scowcroft points out in the video program, "While it is useful to discuss, to lay out what is important and what isn't important, successful negotiations on Third World areas are the last thing that is going to happen because that is where the confrontation really is. We have different views of the world."

office so far, is the most adept at dealing with the media. Even so, as happened in Washington in 1987, he sometimes falls into the trap of giving long-winded lectures which turn off audiences unused to the style of one-party media.

There is not doubt at this time that the U.S.-Soviet relationship has been most crucial in defining the shape and development of the world since the end of World War II. Nor is there any question about the importance of summit meetings between the leaders of the Superpowers in helping define and symbolize that relationship, something media coverage reinforces. A couple of points of reference are worth emphasizing, to keep in mind when considering the record and prospects of U.S.-Soviet summitry.

However important they might be, summits are only one element in the increasingly complicated web of interactions between the Superpowers. U.S.-Soviet summits may symbolize and help define the relationship, but most do little to change it substantially. The two nations' basic views of the world remain fundamentally opposed, and their national goals competitive. In such circumstances, the overall balance of forces—military, social, political and economic—between the Superpowers has far more to do with the character of the relationship at a given time than the results of a given summit meeting.

Normal diplomacy continues on other tracks, even during the period of preparation for a summit. In fact, the elaborate, media-driven signing ceremonies at summits only certify negotiations successfully conducted elsewhere; and some of the most important postwar agreements involving the two nations were negotiated without summitry, such as the Austrian Peace Treaty (1955) and the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (1963).

Furthermore, U.S.-Soviet relations work in a context broader even than that of the Superpower relationship. In an era when summitry has become a commonplace element in international relations worldwide, both presidents and general secretaries hold frequent meetings with other leaders. Many are

bilateral, but some take place in major multilateral meetings, such as the annual "economic summit" of the leaders of the industrialized Western democracies, which can have an important role in defining international relationships.

Though U.S.-Soviet summitry catches the eye of international media, U.S.-Soviet summits may not always even be the most important meetings a given American president holds. Indeed, they may not even be the most critical to the Superpower relationship. It is easy to argue that the most important summit of the Nixon presidency was not any of the three with Brezhnev, but the one with Mao in China in 1972, and this statement may be true even if one considers only the impact on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Certainly, Jimmy Carter's meetings with Menachem Begin of Israel and Anwar Sadat of Egypt at Camp David in 1978, which led to their peace treaty the next year, will surely be considered historically more important than his meeting with Brezhnev, despite their signing of the SALT treaty. And again, this judgment may prove valid even if only weighed in terms of the relationship between the Superpowers, for whom the Middle East has been a long-standing area of dangerous tension.

Summits will almost certainly continue, though the variables which affect them may well continue to make their pattern unpredictable from one administration to another, even one year to another. They have been a valuable instrument in Superpower diplomacy, though only one of many. In order to make them work best, both American presidents and the public need to keep them in perspective to understand their place in the larger picture, and to understand that summits are to some degree always hostage to other events.

Perhaps we would be well served to go back to the beginning of U.S.-Soviet summitry. Though he surely understood the historical importance of his meeting with Stalin, FDR may not have understood at Teheran just what he was setting in motion. Nor perhaps did Eisenhower in his first postwar summit at Geneva, or in his initial bilateral meeting with Khrushchev. Each may have hoped that he was "bending history" by his effort, and may well have foreseen the value of a continuing system of communications between leaders. But each man probably saw his meeting's greatest importance as its role in dealing with problems of the time.

The process of U.S.-Soviet summitry has grown in visibility over the years, sometimes almost seeming to take on a life of its own. We need to remember its original purpose, operating within the context of a continuing, complex relationship on a number of levels. Before each new summit, all of us, governments and citizens alike, need to remember this basic fact, rather than demanding miracles.

About the Video Program

BASIC ISSUES OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY is exactly what its title says. The program identifies a series of critical issues which run through U.S.-Soviet summitry and uses the expertise of the participants to help viewers put into perspective six issues by answering basic questions about them.

Among the basic questions dealt with are:

- Do summits really change things? Or are they just one more element in a complicated diplomatic process which goes on regardless?
- Why do arms control issues dominate the agendas of recent summits, when other conflicts around the world—the so-called "regional issues"—seem so central to the relationship between the Superpowers?
- In an era of intense media interest in U.S.-Soviet summitry, how does the coverage affect the summit process?
- What is the impact of the varying frequency of summit meetings between the Superpowers?
- Are the bilateral summits of the Superpowers likely to remain the best forum for dealing with issues affecting them in the future?
- Are there emerging trends in international relations which viewers might watch out for in terms of their potential to influence future U.S.-Soviet relations and the resulting process of summitry?

Finally, panelists were asked to draw on their scholarship and experience and offer succinct lessons concerning Superpower summitry.

Major participants in these discussions include Robert Bowie, Walt Rostow, Brent Scowcroft, Robert Hunter, Stephen Ambrose, Robert Conquest, Robert Legvold, Richard Rosecrance and Adam Ulam. The moderators, James Billington and Allen Weinstein, conclude the program with their own ideas on the discussions and the issues they raised.

Questions to Consider

1. What is the real purpose of summit meetings between the Superpowers?

2. Summits have now become enormous media events. Does this high media profile interfere with the summit process?

3. The background essay talks about the four major agenda topics which have dominated postwar Superpower summits. Are these topics sufficient to cover the needed points of negotiation, or should others be added? If so, what subjects should be added?

4. Why does the arms control issue seem to dominate summit agendas?

5. What approaches have been taken toward arms limitations? What has been the overall record of these approaches? What is the current course for arms control?

6. What is the value of holding summits on a regular basis? Should summits go on, even if one Superpower becomes involved in a controversial military action disapproved by the other? Why did you take your position on this question?

7. In the video, Walt Rostow mentions "something that I think is operating on the Soviet Union that has very little to do with the United States but is quite profound." What is it? What other evidence to you have to support or contest this viewpoint?

8. What would be your own evaluation of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations? What events in the past year or two have contributed significantly to shaping this current situation?

9. Look at the map of regional "hotspots" which have been associated with postwar summits. Have any of these "regional issues" been significantly affected by summit meetings? Are there any of these areas which you can identify as no longer significant points of confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.? Which ones would you expect to be the most likely areas of such confrontation in the future?

10. How do summits contribute to promoting peace throughout the world? What other actions can, and do, the Superpowers undertake in this endeavor?

11. Which lessons drawn by the participants seemed to you most valuable in your own efforts to understand Superpower summitry?

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More Suggested Readings

In addition to the many distinguished works by the **Face-to-Face** panelists and the publications listed in the individual units, the following memoirs are valuable resources for further inquiry into the American-Soviet relationship.

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The U.S. Institute of Peace is an independent nonprofit corporation established by Congress in 1984 to enhance knowledge and skills in the management of international conflict and the search for peace among nations. Toward this end, the Institute promotes multidisciplinary scholarship, education, training, and the dissemination of information about the peaceful resolution of international conflict. The Institute is nonpartisan and noninterventionist. It does not take positions on political candidates or on issues pending before Congress or other domestic or international legislative bodies. Among its programs, the Institute's Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace provides fellowships and other support for scholars and leaders in peace from the United States and abroad.

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The Wilson Center is an independent entity in the Smithsonian Institution that was created to be a unique "living institution expressing the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson." The Center works twelve months a year with an ever-changing company of Fellows, internationally distinguished scholars, conducting basic research on major long-term issues to deepen understanding of the world. Scholarly excellence, nonpartisan depth, and human variety undergird the entire operation. Each of the Wilson Center's programs, among them—The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Latin American Program, The Asia Program, and The International Security Studies Program—makes a substantive contribution to international studies by linking the intellectual and practical worlds.

About the South Carolina Educational Television Network

For 30 years, the South Carolina Educational Television Network has been producing quality instructional programming for one of the most sophisticated and extensive communications systems in the nation. Launched in the late 1950s as a city-wide venture, the network has matured into a unique statewide link of 11 TV stations and seven FM radio stations.

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Acclaimed as the major PBS production center in the Southeast, the network has produced and/or presented many television programs and series for the national schedule including **Roanoak**, **Heart of the Dragon** and **Voices & Visions.**

FACE-TO-FACE

U.S.-Soviet Summitry

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